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1 Abstract
Between the years 2001 and 2015, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia implemented a policy
providing mandatory and free college admission exams (ACT or SAT) to all public high school juniors.
As such, the policy reduced to zero out of pocket expenses for exam fees, and likely reduced out-of-pocket
expenses for exam preparation, because schools might have been induced to provide such a service in-house.
The policy also reduced the time cost of test taking because the test is administered during class time and
at a student’s school. Because the mandatory exam is administered during the junior year, the policy may
also have increased the amount of information a student has about her college prospects earlier on in her
decision making process. In this paper I hypothesize that the decreased costs and increased information may
induce more students to apply to and enroll in college. I use both college-level longitudinal data (IPEDS)
along with cross-sectional student-level data (ACS) to test these predictions. Specifically, I exploit the fact
that not all states implemented the policy and that those which did so implemented the policy at different
points in time. In the college-level analysis, I find that the average college saw an increase in about 88
enrolled students and 460 applications from the policy without any effect on their graduation rates. In the
individual-level analysis, I find that treated individuals have approximately 1.03 times the odds of untreated
individuals of attending college. In the appendix I propose a model for the decision to apply, enroll, and
complete college.
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2 Introduction
In order to examine if a student’s decision to apply to and attend college is influenced by allowing her to
receive more information about her own abilities earlier in the process, I examine the impact of a natural
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experiment wherein some states mandated a college admissions exam to comply with No Child Left Behind.
No Child Left Behind (NCLB), passed in 2001, stipulated that some part of federal funding to schools is to
distributed based on a state-developed measure of “Adequate Yearly Progress”. That is, schools are to be
rewarded for improving their students’ test scores and for having all students achieve minimum proficiency
standards. Some states developed their own measures of adequate yearly progress but many conveniently
opted to use the ACT and SAT (either right away in 2001, or subsequently) for evaluating older students.1
By 2012, twelve states had accordingly mandated either test to their junior students. Because colleges have
used the ACT and SAT scores to determine admissions and merit-based scholarships, the tests are high-stake
for both students and school districts.
In this paper, I estimate the effect of mandating the taking of one of these standardized tests (“the
policy”) on college application, enrollment, and completion rates. Specifically, I develop a model for a
student’s decision to take the standardized test, apply, enroll and complete college in the first section of the
appendix. Under suitable assumptions, the model predicts that the policy would result in more students
applying and enrolling in college and would not reduce completion rates. To test these predictions I use cross-
sectional student-level data and panel college-level data and exploit the fact that not all states implemented
the policy and that those which did so implemented it at different points in time.
The prior may be to expect that $50 is a small amount of money to influence a rational actor’s decision
to attend college given the large long-term benefits of a college education. Previous behavioral economics
literature would suggest that small nudges can induce larger than expected behavioral changes. For example,
Pallais (2013) found that when the ACT exam company increased the number of free test score reports that
can be sent to colleges, the fraction of students who increased the number of reports sent far exceeded
what would be expected given that the marginal cost of sending an additional test score report is merely
$6. Pallais concluded that high school students may not have full information when doing the cost benefit
analysis of deciding to apply to colleges since their behavior dramatically changes between offering to send
1No Child Left Behind was a 2001 update of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. This is an act renewed regularly
since 1965 to provide funding to schools serving low-income and special needs students. No Child Left Behind created more
stipulations on federal government money flowing to states for education, including requiring schools develop exams to measure
“adequate yearly progress” of students’ improvements and academic proficiency. This policy affected all states’ low-income
schools essentially equally. The difference I use is whether or not schools happen to choose the ACT or SAT as a measurement
of “Adequate Yearly Progress”, or proof that students are improving their test scores and that students meet a minimum
standard of knowledge. This was to be systematically recorded for both overall school statistics and for each sociodemographic
subgroup. Most states use for all grades, including 11th, the passing of state-specific examinations that otherwise have no
impact on an individual’s future.
It should also be noted that while I make this generalization, as discussed in the appendix, some states adopted this policy
instead simply as a means to encourage college attendance in their states and not to conform to NCLB standards specifically.
However, in all states, schools were still evaluated in part due to their students’ performance on the exam, and the earliest
states to adopt the policy were doing so to adhere to NCLB standards. Therefore, this generalization is made.
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a free test score report and a test score report at $6. Similarly, Mayer et al. (2015) found that substantially
more parents read to their preschool children when sent a text reminder, further demonstrating that small
nudges can create dramatic changes in behavior. These findings are relevant to this paper because mandating
standardized tests may also be regarded as a small change in financial incentives. The policy made the tests
free, waiving the relatively small $55 fee that both the ACT and SAT companies usually charge a student2.
We may therefore expect large responses to this policy. However, analysis carried out by several researchers
have produced mixed results, in that the magnitude of the effects seems not to be robust to the choice of
time period and may vary depending on school’s characteristics (selective versus not).
Specifically, Hurwitz et al. (2015) studied the impact of the mandatory and free SAT for the state of
Maine using proprietary data for the first three years of the policy’s implementation in the state. Through
a difference-in-difference design, they found that college enrollment increased by 2 to 3 percent on average,
and that of those students who were induced to take the SAT via the policy, enrollment increased by
10%. In order to study the effects of the program on Maine students, Hurwitz et al. merged four datasets
together: the College Board3 data from 2004-2008 regarding student performance on SAT exam and high
school attended, the National Student Clearinghouse4 data on students’ college attendance, the National
Center for Education Statistics data (IPEDS) on the demographics of particular high schools, and Census
data on the demographics of students’ schools’ zip codes where high schools are located. Analysis compared
the college attendance rates of a sample of Maine high school seniors to seniors from other SAT-dominant
states5. They find that most of the increase in enrollment came from Maine’s rural students in comparison
to their urban or suburban ones. They further use a 2SLS approach to approximate the treatment effect on
the treated, using the policy change as an instrument for the percentage of people taking the exam.
Klasik (2013) revisited Hurwitz et al.’s analysis by adding data for 2009 and the states of Colorado and
Illinois, which mandated the ACT in 2001. Klasik employs a difference-in-differences approach wherein he
identifies states that are similar in demographics and pre-policy college enrollment to treated states using
synthetic controls. He performs separate difference-in-difference approaches analyzing data on the individual
level or on the state level. Individual-level data on college-freshman aged individuals was collected from the
Census’s Current Population Survey. For state level data, Klasik uses the National Center for Education
2As of 2017, this was a $55 fee to take either test with the writing portion, $40 to take the ACT without the writing portion
and $43 to take the SAT without the writing portion. Regardless of the specific exam taken, the exam fee is small.
3The company that produces the SAT, also the company that Hurwitz et al. work for.
4A private company that provides college transcript services. By matching student names from the SAT data, Hurwitz et
al. know the students’ majors, college attended, and degree completion status.
5The SAT and ACT tests are well-documented to be regionally dominated. For example, in Nebraska in 2016 (a state that
does not mandate the ACT or SAT) had 18,598 students take the ACT and 604 take the SAT. Washington state had 16,652
students take the ACT but 43,783 students take the SAT. (Saget 2013)
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Statistics IPEDS college enrollment data, which collects college enrollment for every college. He assumes that
students generally go to college in the same state they attended high school, and thus labels any college or
individual student in a state that implemented the policy as “treated”. Using the state-level analysis, Klasik
estimates an overall 10% drop in enrollment in Maine and documented that two-years collages experience
the drop in enrollment but four-year colleges experience no change in enrollment. Klasik found no overall
change in college enrollment in Colorado or Illinois. Private and public four-year colleges in Illinois saw an
increase in enrollment by 12%, while in Colorado, only private colleges saw a 10% increase in enrollment.
Using individual-level analysis, Klasik estimates that Colorado students were more likely to enroll in two-year
colleges or full-time, but no more likely to enroll in college overall. Illinois students were 10% more likely to
enroll in any college, and most likely to enroll in a four-year college. Maine students were no more likely to
enroll in any college. Part of the discrepancy in the findings concerning Maine may be due to the different
data sources used by Hurwitz et al. (2015) and Klasik, and the fact that Klasik uses either state-level or
individual-level analysis while Hurwitz et al. use only individual-level analysis. Most importantly, Hurwitz
et al. knew students’s state of origin from proprietary data, while Klasik assumed students never move and
that all colleges, including private or flagship universities, only enroll in-state students.
Goodman (2016) confirms Klasik (2013)’s finding of no overall impact on enrollment in in Colorado
and Illinois but reports a 20% increase in selective college enrollment. Goodman estimates the percentage
of students who receive “competitive” test scores who took the ACT exam because they were forced to
take the ACT exam. Her assumption for a “competitive” score relies upon a figure given in a common
college entrance advice book, Barron’s. She uses this third party resource to divide college selectiveness
into discrete categories, and then estimates changes in enrollment within each discrete category. I improve
upon this assumption by not assuming that college selectiveness remains fixed over time as Goodman does.
Instead, I will use the IPEDS data to test if colleges respond to an influx in applicants by changing their
level of selectiveness, as measured by the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentile of ACT and SAT scores.
Goodman estimates that about half of students were induced to take the exam, about 40-45% of induced
students received competitive scores (as per Barron’s definition), and as a result, selective college enrollment
(as determined by the discrete categories informed by Barron’s) increased by 20%.
I contribute to the above research along several dimensions. First, I include in my analysis all the states
and classify as “treated” those that made standardized tests mandatory at any point between 2001 and
2012 (11 states out of 50). Second and related, I expand the window of time which gives me more years
before and after the policy change for the states that did mandate the tests. Conveniently, the long time
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window also enables me to relax the common trend assumption, often invoked in the difference-in-difference
design. By using more states over more years, I am therefore less prone to overstate the impact of the
policy due to short-term changes in student’s incentives that occurred contemporaneously with the policy.
Building on Goodman’s insight that the impact may vary depending on college selectivity, I include college
selectivity in my analysis. Additionally, I acknowledge that colleges may have responded to the policy by
changing their selectiveness and test this assumption (which Goodman maintained). However, some of the
discrepancy between Klasik (2013) and Hurwitz et al. (2015) also comes from the fact that Hurwitz et al.
can more accurately define which students are treated, rather than making the assumption of Klasik (2013)
that students never move and both private and public colleges only take in-state students. I improve upon
Klasik’s assumption that colleges only take in-state students by using their levels of enrollment from each
state prior to the policy to create an “intensity to treat” measure. Unfortunately, I lack the proprietary data
to improve the never moving assumption for individuals, and therefore may be likely to make similar errors
to Klasik in this regard. Finally, I also explore the impacts on college graduation rates, which has not been
seriously analyzed in past studies.
I carry out my analysis on two separate datasets. The first is the Integrated Postsecondary Education
Data System survey (IPEDS, 2000-2013) and the second is the American Community Survey (ACS, 2000-
2014). On any given year, IPEDS contains data on every college that received any federal funds, including
for financial aid. Accordingly, the sample includes the vast majority of U.S. universities because it is illegal
for any institution that receives federal funds not to report to IPEDS6. This data source provides excellent
information to measure year-to-year changes in college enrollment and applications, as well as time invariant
characteristics such as whether a collage is for-profit, private, two or four years, etc.. While IPEDS was also
used by Hurwitz et al. (2015), Goodman (2016) and Klasik (2013), I choose to supplement the analysis by
also employing the ACS. The ACS data is a nationally representative survey of households carried out yearly
by the Census Bureau. It contains individual-level information on, for instance, current schooling status,
highest degree completed, etc.. The ACS is therefore better suited to measuring changes in the proportion
of college-aged individuals attending colleges. However, it does not provide information on a person’s college
application decision nor any detail about the college attended.
A key step in using either dataset is establishing an indicator for whether the unit of observation (a college
in the IPEDS data, an individual in the ACS data) was “treated”, i.e. impacted by the policy. Neither dataset
6It is impossible to know precisely how many institutions choose to operate without using any federal funds. Such institutions
will tend to be non-accredited and most likely not have enforced standards of admissions. In other words, we don’t expect such
institutions to be impacted by the policy. As it is, IPEDS has data on 7,500 postsecondary institutions in the United States,
and is the most comprehensive database of postsecondary institutions.
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knows precisely how many students were juniors in public high schools at the time of the treatment. In the
IPEDS data, I create a measure of “intensity of treatment” based upon the pre-treatment freshmen residency
composition of a college. This then approximates about what percent of the untreated student body would
have been treated without the mandatory college entrance exam. This has not been done in any previous
analysis, which consistently assumed colleges were either completely treated or untreated based on what state
they were physically located. For the ACS data, I estimate whether an individual was treated by assuming
they went to high school in the state they lived one year prior to the survey. Due to this much stronger
assumption, I believe that the IPEDS data more “accurately” identifies who belongs to the treated group. A
common set of critiques of the IPEDS data is that it undercounts first-year, part-time students (Soldner et
al. 2016) and that it undercounts online students (Straumsheim 2014). Online universities are more likely to
be open enrollment, so I do not expect this to greatly impact my analysis. However, since the college-level
analysis only includes full-time students, I may be understating the policy’s impact if we expect that students
who are impacted by the policy are more likely to enroll part-time. Since first generation college students
are more likely to be part-time (Engle and Tinto 2008), and I expect that first generation students are more
likely impacted by the policy than students with parents who attended college, it is reasonable to think I
am somewhat underestimating the impact of the policy using the IPEDS data by not counting part-time
students.
The first step I took with the IPEDS college-level analysis was to see if colleges were induced to have
higher admissions due to an increase in applicants from the policy. This was approximated by testing
to see if the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles changed from the ACT or SAT scores of admitted
students. Additionally, I also checked if the admission rate changed overall. I found little evidence to suggest
that colleges have been modifying their admissions standards in response to more students applying to and
attending college. My limited evidence may suggest that more highly-qualified students are applying to
and being accepted to colleges, particularly ACT colleges, but that lower-qualified students are not being
adversely effected by this shift. Enrollment at the average college increased by 443 students as if the intensity
of treatment increased by 100%, or 88 at the average college for the average intensity of treatment. The
number of applicants also increases by 2,378 with a 100% increase in treatment, or 460 at the average college
with average treatment, albeit only significantly at the 10% level rather than the 5% level. Graduation rates
are not impacted, so I have reason to believe that the increase in enrollment comes from students who are
just as prepared to enter college as their untreated peers.
The individual-level analysis with the ACS data shows similar, but somewhat contradictory results.
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Odds of contemporaneous enrollment changes in magnitude and direction depending on the subset of the
data examined. All studied models explain very little variation in the data (less than 10% in all cases), so I
am not confident these results adequately control for confounding factors. For college-aged individuals listed
as dependents of their parents, the odds of enrollment only marginally increase, and are only statistically
significant on the 10% level for freshmen-aged individuals. For all individuals, not controlling for parent
income7, the results are still marginal for enrollment, and only significant when examining college-aged
individuals specifically. Overall, these results are contradictory and have extremely small size effects, so
I conclude the policy has a marginal effect at the most on the odds of enrollment. The odds of being a
college dropout or college graduate are greater for beyond college aged (twenty-three or older) individuals
who received the treatment than those who did not. However, the odds of having college enrollment are
no different in treated versus untreated states when including older as well as college-aged individuals in
the sample. The incompatibility of these results with the increased odds of being currently enrolled in
college makes me believe I have mis-approximated who is “treated” and “untreated” in the ACS data. This
is particularly true because many treated states are highly rural states with fewer opportunities for college
graduates, so college graduates are the least likely to be correctly labeled as living in the same state as where
they grew up. These mechanisms will be further investigated.
First, I will discuss my two primary data sources, and how each can be used to see if the policy increased
college enrollment and applications. Then, I will propose an econometric model for analysis. The results of
the econometric analysis will be presented and analyzed. An appendix contains the beginning framework of
a model to explain the economic mechanisms behind the policy’s impact. This appendix also contains more
details about ACT and SAT policies, including the marginal differences between states that could effect
student behavior.
3 The Data
Ideally, I would have data at the individual-level wherein I knew the student’s socioeconomic characteristics
and whether they attended a public high school in a state with the policy. However, such data is not publicly
available. Instead, in my analysis I use both college-level National Center for Education Statistics data
(IPEDS) and individual-level Census American Community Survey (ACS) data. I supplement both databases
with Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data regarding state GDP per capita and state unemployment rates
7It is impossible to control for parent income when we do not have individuals listed on the survey as dependents.
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to also control for the effects of state-wide characteristics that may effect the decision to go to college. The
college-level analysis does not allow me to know what types of individuals are induced by the policy to attend
college, but does reduce measurement error of the treatment itself. The individual-level analysis gives more
detail as to what types of individuals are influenced by the policy, but has more measurement error for the
treatment variable. I will first describe the college-level data, then the individual-level data.
3.1 College-Level Data
The IPEDS database contains data on every college that receives any federal funds, including for financial
aid, which is the vast majority of U.S. universities attended. This data is collected annually and is self-
reported by the colleges. The longitudinal data enables me to compare year-to-year changes in enrollment
and applications at the college level. It also provides information on institutional characteristics, such as
highest degree offered and whether the institution is private. I use data from the year 2000 to construct base
characteristics for each college. Time invariant characteristics include the college’s the admissions rate, as a
proxy for its selectivity, the percentage of the student body from racial and ethnic minority groups in 2000,
whether or not the college is mainly applied to using the ACT or SAT test, the tuition charged in the year
2000, the highest degree level offered, the graduation rate in 2000, whether or not the college is a military
academy, and whether the college is private or for-profit.
I regard years 2001 to 2013 as the treatment years8. Because the earliest adopted policy was in spring
of 2001 by Colorado and Illinois, the earliest affected freshmen class is those entering college in the fall of
2002. Therefore, I have at least one treated and one untreated year for each state.
Not all colleges necessarily fill out the survey completely each year. Approximately 90% of public colleges
and 85% of non-profit colleges have all fourteen years of data, and all colleges have at least two years of
data. Therefore, since these are the schools most affected by the ACT policy, I am not concerned by the
missing data of a few years. I only use schools that are not “open enrollment”, i.e. I use schools that are only
“competitive colleges”.9The colleges have the pre-treatment characteristics outlined in Tables 1 and 2. I proxy
the prestige and quality of the school by controlling for the highest degree offered and their pre-treatment
graduation rates, as well as other pre-treatment characteristics.
8See appendix for when precisely each state adopted the policy.
9I define for now “competitive” college to mean that the college has an application process at all. If any students are able
to be rejected from the school, even if only a small percentage, the college is “competitive”. This is to contrast with open
enrollment schools where anyone with a high school diploma or GED can attend so long as they fill out the paperwork.
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Table 1: Pre-Treatment Characteristics of Colleges (Year 2000)
Observations
(Number of
Colleges)
Mean 25th
Per-
centile
50th
Per-
centile
75th
Per-
centile
Number of Years of Data 2,842 13
(2.83)
14 14 14
Graduation Rate, 2000 2,076 0.52
(0.22)
0.37 0.51 0.67
Admission Rate, 2001 2,388 0.74
(0.21)
0.64 0.78 0.89
Percent Black 2000 2,803 0.14
(0.21)
0.02 0.06 0.17
Percent Native American
2000
2,803 0.01
(0.05)
0.00 0.00 0.01
Percent Asian, 2000 2,803 0.04
(0.08)
0.00 0.01 0.04
Percent Hispanic 2000 2,803 0.08
(0.14)
0.01 0.03 0.08
Percent White 2000 2,803 0.67
(0.28)
0.50 0.76 0.89
Percent Unknown Race
2000
2,803 0.04
(0.11)
0.00 0.00 0.04
Standard deviation in parenthesis.
Table 2: Highest Degree Offered by College (Year 2000)
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Award of less than
one academic year
99 3.48 3.48
At least 1, but less
than 2 academic
years
469 16.5 19.99
Associates degree 384 13.51 33.5
At least 2, but less
than 4 academic
years
275 9.68 43.17
Bachelors degree 494 17.38 60.56
Post-baccalaureate
certificate
27 0.95 61.51
Masters degree 535 18.82 80.33
Post-masters
certificate
155 5.45 85.78
Doctors degree 404 14.22 100
Number of Colleges 2,842 100
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As table 2 shows, a wide variety of types of institutions exist in the dataset. I use an indicator variable
for each type of highest degree offered in the regressions. This, combined with data on graduation rates, is
used as a proxy for “college quality”. While some future analysis may use these measures to create an index
of “college quality”, I use indicator variables for the highest degree offered and the graduation rate in 2000
directly in my analysis to roughly control for “college quality”.
When doing a few simple graphs, we see that enrollment and application numbers increased as intensity
of treatment increased. These can be seen in Figures 1, 2, and 3. The admissions rate remains relatively
stable over time, although it dips immediately after the recession, as seen in Figure 3. Increases in the
admissions and enrollment rates coincide with increases in the proportion of treated individuals, as seen in
Figures 1 and 2. While there is a consistent upward trend in applications and enrollment, the slopes become
steeper as the proportion of treated students increases. This would suggest that the policy does increase
applications and enrollment.
3.1.1 Treatment and Comparison Colleges
To identify treated individuals, I create an “intensity of treatment” variable based upon 2000 level of freshman
undergraduate residency. This has not been previously done in the literature, which always assumed that all
colleges in treated states would be equally impacted by the policy and all colleges in untreated states would be
equally not impacted by the policy. Instead, I propose that the intensity of treatment at colleges is determined
by the historical patterns of full-time first-time freshmen undergraduate residency10. For example, if fifty
percent of the University of Colorado comes from Colorado in 2000 but eighty-five percent of Colorado State
University comes from Colorado in 2000, then Colorado State University would be more “intensely” impacted
by Colorado adopting the policy. Similarly, if fifteen percent of the University of Wyoming’s freshman class
comes from Colorado, but only two percent of University of Alaska’s freshman class comes from Colorado,
then the University of Wyoming will be more intensely treated than the University of Alaska.
10As previously noted in the introduction, this does not include part-time students. This has been cited as a major flaw in the
IPEDS data, as many first generation college students opt to begin as part-time students (Soldner et al. 2016). This should bias
our results downward, i.e. underestimate the effects of the policy, since I would suspect that first-generation college students are
more likely to have their behavior changed by the policy than students who live in families with a college attendance culture.
11
Figure 1:
Figure 2:
Figure 3:
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Table 3: University of Michigan Ann Arbor Treatment
Year Additional States Treated Percent of year 2000
freshmen from these states
Intensity of Treatment for
University of Michigan
2001 None 0.00% 0.00%
2002 Colorado and Illinois 4.91% 4.91%
2003 ′′ ′′ 4.91%
2004 ′′ ′′ 4.91%
2005 ′′ ′′ 4.91%
2006 ′′ ′′ 4.96%
2007 Maine and Wyoming 0.06% 4.96%
2008 Michigan 58.95% 63.92%
2009 Kentucky 0.31% 64.23%
2010 North Dakota 0.02% 64.23%
2011 Tennessee and Delaware 0.20% 64.43%
2012 ′′ ′′ 64.45%
2013 North Carolina and Idaho 0.26% 64.71%
Table 4: Kalamazoo College Treatment
Year Additional States Treated Percent of year 2000
freshmen from these states
Intensity of Treatment for
Kalamazoo College
2001 None 0.00% 0.00%
2002 Colorado and Illinois 3.69% 3.69%
2003 ′′ ′′ 3.69%
2004 ′′ ′′ 3.69%
2005 ′′ ′′ 3.69%
2006 ′′ ′′ 3.69%
2007 Maine and Wyoming 0.00% 3.69%
2008 Michigan 82.46% 86.15%
2009 Kentucky 0.62% 86.77%
2010 North Dakota 0.00% 86.77%
2011 Tennessee and Delaware 0.00% 86.77%
2012 ′′ ′′ 86.77%
2013 North Carolina and Idaho 0.31% 87.08%
To demonstrate more precisely, I will outline each year’s intensity of treatment at University of Michigan
at Ann Arbor. In 2000, the the composition of the freshman class corresponds to intensity of treatment can
be seen in table 3. We can compare this to Kalamazoo College, a private liberal arts college in the same state
with a larger in-state draw in table 4. As we can see, the regional Kalamazoo College is more “intensely”
impacted than University of Michigan from Michigan adopting the policy because University of Michigan
draws historically less from Michigan itself. Similarly, University of Michigan is more intensely impacted
when Colorado and Illinois adopted the policy because Kalamazoo College does not draw many students
from out of state.
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3.2 Individual-Level Data
I couple the college-level analysis with individual-level analysis of the American Community Survey (ACS).
This data is better suited for measuring the changes in the proportion of college-aged individuals attending
colleges, as well as parsing out what types of individuals are impacted by the policy. While the IPEDS
data can measure the increases in enrollment, it cannot measure the increases in enrollment in comparison
to increasing or decreasing numbers of college-aged individuals. Additionally, I can better measure how the
policy impacts different socioeconomic groups.
For individuals who were college-aged at the time of the survey, the average age is 21, and for individuals
post-college (but old enough to have been potentially treated during the earliest treatment, 2001), the
average age is 26. Data from 2000 to 2014 is used, like with the IPEDS data. The sample size is 3,230,912,
substantially larger than the colleges in the IPEDS data.
3.2.1 Treatment and Comparison Individuals
For the ACS data, I estimate whether an individual was treated by assuming they went to high school in the
state they lived one year prior to the survey. Due to this much stronger assumption, I believe that the IPEDS
data more accurately labels who belongs to the treated group. An individual is classified as “treated” if they
lived one year ago in a treated state and were high school aged at the time of the treatment. For most years
I can estimate when people were juniors in high school using quarter of birth data. I presume people born
between January and September are juniors in high school sixteen years after their year of birth, and people
born in the last quarter are juniors in high school seventeen years after their year of birth. For data the first
four years of data we do not have quarter of birth data, so I conservatively code people as if they were born
in the fourth quarter (therefore we are likely to identify high school juniors who are actually seniors, and
therefore underestimate the proportion of the population who had not been treated by a marginal amount).
Since this is true for earlier years in the data, I only underestimate the number treated in this regard in
Illinois and Colorado.
As seen in Table 5, here are marginal differences between the treated and untreated, but in general, the
treated group has more people going to and completing college. There are a total of 226,162 treated and
3,004,750 untreated individuals in the dataset. For college-aged individuals, 828,400 (42.25%) are not listed
as dependents while 1,132,099 (57.75%) are.
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Table 5: College Enrollment, Dropouts, and Graduates in ACS Data by Subsample
Observations Mean, Treated Mean, Untreated
College Enrollment, College Aged 1,960,499 0.52 0.48
College Dropout, Post-College Aged 1,588,882 0.27 0.28
College Graduate, Post-College Aged 1,588,882 0.42 0.36
College Enrollment, Post-High School Aged 3,230,912 0.62 0.58
I use the highly flawed measure of assuming people do not move between states. For people currently in
college, this is not a particularly far-fetched assumption. It has been shown in previous literature that people
tend to go to college close to home (Long 2004) geographically, and this therefore will typically translate to
going to college within the same state. This is especially true in my data, where most treated states are
geographically large (except for Delaware). I treat people as having gone to high school in the location they
lived in as of one year prior to the survey, under the assumption people rarely move, and if they move, they
do not move particularly often.
This skews towards more accurately labeling people as treated if they have recently entered college or
never went to college, as these are the people least likely to move out of state. Therefore, my results trying to
evaluate the impact of treatment on those who are well into their twenties are most likely the least accurate
for those who attended college. Nevertheless, I explore these results.
3.2.2 Individuals Listed as Dependents
For most individuals in the dataset, I do not know the income of the parents. Parental socioeconomic status
is a strong predictor of college enrollment (Desilver 2014) (Delaney 1998), and would ideally be contained
in all of my models. Additionally, as explained above, it is far more accurate to know the location of the
parents when designating whether an individual went to high school in a treated state, as most individuals
would have attended high school in the state their parents live. Therefore, to both control for parental
income and more accurately designate individuals as treated, I run one sent of regressions on freshmen-aged
and college-aged individuals listed as dependents in the American Community Survey 11to predict if they
are currently attending college. This will also serve as a check as to the accuracy of the “never moving”
assumption for non-dependents. In Table 6, we can see that the individuals listed dependents skew towards
the more wealthy, which may then understate the policy’s impact.
11The American Community Survey can be sent to the college or parental residence of college-aged individuals. I define
“dependents” as anyone who is listed as a non-spousal family member of the head of household.
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Table 6: Parental Income of Dependents
Income Frequency Percent
Over $250,000 99,053 3.35
Between $150,000 and $250,000 205,627 6.96
Between $100,000 and $150,000 426,372 14.44
Between $75,000 and $100,000 425,202 14.40
Between $50,000 and $75,000 581,866 19.71
Between $25,000 and $50,000 675,454 22.28
Between $10,000 and $25,000 369,391 12.51
Less than $10,000 169,712 5.75
Total 2,952,677
Source: ACS
4 The Empirical Analysis
I conduct two separate analyses:
1. College-Level Analysis: Using panel IPEDS data where each observation unit is a college, I test
whether admissions standards, enrollment, and graduation rates are impacted by the policy. I employ
a difference-in-difference design and inspect admissions rate, accepted students’ scores, application
numbers, enrollment numbers, and graduation rates.
2. Individual-Level Analysis: Using cross-sectional Census ACS data where each observation unit is an
individual, I test whether enrollment and graduation rates are impacted by the policy. Each measure is
a binary outcome variable indicating whether someone is enrolled in college or has completed college.
I employ a difference-in-difference design and inspect college enrollment and completion within each
subpopulation. I break down by subpopulation to compensate for the previously described tradeoffs
between increasing sample size and increasing measurement error of the treatment itself. Measurement
error is reduced the most for freshmen-aged individuals listed as dependents, and highest for those who
are the longest out of high school.
4.1 College-Level Analysis
For college c in state sduring year t
Ycst = βDct + γXcst + δWcs + αSst + ζs + pit + χst + ucst (1)
Ycst is the outcome variable, as described below. Dct is college c’s intensity of treatment at year t. Therefore,
I am specifically interested in the parameter β, reflecting the amount that Ycst increases if the college changes
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from having no students treated to all students treated that year. In order words, it is the increase in Ycst
for each increase in proportion of students treated by 100%. Because Dct is on a scale from 0 to 1, the β
can be multiplied by the proportion of students treated in college c at time t to find the amount that Ycst
was projected to increase due to the treatment.
Xcst are the time variant college characteristics for college c in state s in year t. Time variant college
characteristics include in-state tuition and out-of-state tuition. Wcs are the time invariant college c’s char-
acteristics in state s. I consider time invariant college characteristics to be characteristics of the college as
of the year 2000, a base year chosen as pre-NCLB and pre-treatment for all colleges. Time invariant college
characteristics include the historical percent of freshmen from racial minority groups, historical admission
rate (year 2001 instead of 2000, earliest available year), historical 6-year graduation rate12, the highest degree
offered by the institution, an indicator for if the institution is a military service academy, and an indicator
for whether the school is a public, private non-profit, or private for-profit institution. Sst are the time variant
state characteristics, including state s’s GDP per capita at time t and the unemployment rate in state s at
year t. ζs are the state indicator variables, pit are the year indicator variables, and χst are the interactions
between each state and year indicator variable.
I have a few different measures for the outcome variable for college c in state sduring year t, Ycst. In
order to test the effect of the policy on the admissions standards, I use a few different measures:
1. Admission rate: Percentage of students that apply who are admitted. When Ycst is the admissions rate,
β reflects the increase in the percent of students admitted if the percent of treated students increases
by 100%.
2. Twenty-fifth percentile score for admitted students: The 25th percentile score of admitted students to
the college. This is done separately for ACT and SAT dominant college, as determined by which test
is more frequently sent into the college. When Ycst is the 25th percentile score of the ACT or SAT,
β reflects how many points the 25th percentile of admitted students’ scores increase if the percent of
treated students increases by 100%.
3. Seventy-fifth percentile score for admitted students: Similarly, the 75th percentile score of admitted
students to the college. This is done separately for ACT and SAT dominant college, as determined
by which test is more frequently sent into the college. When Ycst is the 75th percentile score of the
ACT or SAT, β reflects how many points the 75th percentile of admitted students’ scores increase if
12The IPEDS survey only reports the 6-year graduation rate, no the 4-year graduation rate.
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the percent of treated students increases by 100%.
This is to see if by virtue of more students applying to college due to the policy, colleges become more com-
petitive to compensate for the surge in applicants. Alternatively, I can see if colleges lower their admissions
standards by accepting students with lower ACT or SAT scores due to the increase in less qualified people
applying for colleges.
I then use the same framework to instead test the policy’s impact on the student’s application, enrollment,
and graduation decision. This is measured by:
1. Applicants: The number of undergraduate applications received by the college
2. Enrollment: The number of freshmen enrolling in the college
3. Graduation rate: The 6-year graduation rate for the college
My college-level analysis depends on the β estimate not being contaminated by ucst, that is, hidden college-
level characteristics that are not captured by time variant or time invariant college-level characteristics, time
variant state characteristics, state fixed effects, time fixed effects, or state-time fixed effects. That is, I expect
that E[ucst|Xcst,Wcs, Sst, ξs, pit, χst] = 0. Therefore, E[Y Dcst=1cst −Y Dcst=0cst |Xcst,Wcs, Sst, ξs, pit, χst] = β, and
β reflects a change from a college being 0% treated to 100% treated.
4.2 Individual-Level Analysis
In order to approximate the effect of the treatment on college enrollment and completion rates, I use a few
different possible outcome variables:
1. College enrollment: Either being currently enrolled in college at the time of the survey or having
attended college in the past.
2. College graduate: Possessing a college degree, whether an associate’s or a bachelor’s degree.
3. College dropout: Having attended but not completed college.
Since all of these outcomes are binary, I use a logistic regression. Suppose that pi(Yist) is the probability of
binary outcome Yist for person i in state s during junior year of high school t(the outcome being any of the
three previously mentioned options). The logistic regression then measures the odds ratio of this outcome,
as measured by log( pi(Yist)1−pi(Yist) ). The regression therefore is:
18
log(
pi(Yist)
1− pi(Yist) ) = Odds Ratio of Yist = β0 + β1Dst + γIist +αSst + µt+ λt
2 + ζs + τζst+ ηζst
2 + uist (2)
To clarify, if Dst is the binary treatment of state sduring junior year of high school t, then β1 reflects the
odds ratio between those who received the treatment and those who did not. If β1 is 1.5 and Yist is college
enrollment, this would mean that students who resided in treated states at time thave 1.5 times the odds of
being enrolled in college as those who did not receive the treatment. If β1 is 0.5, then students who resided
in treated states at time t have 0.5 times the odds of being enrolled in college as those who did not receive
the treatment. Any odds ratio above 1 is a positive effect and below 1 is a negative effect. I am mostly
interested in the coefficient of β1, as this is the effect of the treatment controlling for other factors. I also
interact Dst with some individual characteristics, namely parental income and race, to test if the policy has
a different impact on different populations.
In the same model, Iist contains individual characteristics of person i in state swho was a junior at time
t. This includes race, hispanic origin, physical and cognitive disability, gender, and citizenship status. These
are all observable characteristics expected to impact the individual’s decision to attend college and expected
to differ by state. When the sample is restricted to young adults listed on the survey as dependents of
their parents, family income is also included. For individuals not listed as dependents, parental income is
not possible to ascertain, so it is not included. Sst are characteristics of state s at time t, time t being the
year the individual was a junior in high school. This includes GDP per capita, average in-state tuition at a
bachelor’s degree-granting institution, and consumption per capita as an approximation of cost of living. This
is to approximate the resources the state has to invest in education and the costs of obtaining a bachelor’s
degree for the typical student. ζs contains the state indicator variables. Unlike the college-level regressions,
since Dst is directly measured by the state and year a student was a junior in high school, we cannot include
year indicator variables. This would create identification issues. Instead, treflects the cumulative number of
years since the individual was a junior in high school, and t2 is the number of years squared. This makes
theoretical sense because throughout the 2000s, I expect overall state quality in education to progressively
change, particularly as states adhere to more NCLB standards (implemented in 2001). I include a quadratic
term in case this change is non-linear. Although this strategy of approximating changes within states across
time is not as flexible as though we had used state-year dummies, it is the best model under the constraints
that state-year dummies are simultaneously used to identify treated and control groups.
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I run the same model on a number of different population sub-groups:
1. Dependents: Individuals listed in the ACS survey as dependents of an older family member, typically
a parent.
2. Freshmen-Aged: Individuals who have been out of high school 0-1 years at the time of the survey. This
implicitly makes the assumption students are traditional students, but we expect our policy to effect
traditional students more as well.
3. College-Aged: Individuals who have been out of high school 0-4 years at the time of the survey.
4. Past College-Aged: Individuals who have been out of high school at least 4 years at the time of the
survey.
5. Past High School-Aged: Individuals who are out of high school at the time of the survey.
In order to be part of the studied subsample, individuals must have been a junior in high school between the
years of 2000 and 2012. The earliest treated individuals were high school juniors in 2001 in either Illinois or
Colorado.
I cannot see both treated and control individuals from the same state and the same time, so I capture state
effects with state dummies and time effects using a continuous time variable to indicate the time in which
the survey was taken both nationwide and within each state, and can average out that E[ui] − E[ui′ ] = 0
and E[Ii] − E[Ii′ ] = 0. Therefore, E[Y D=1ist − Y D=0ist | junior in HS between 2000 and 2012] = β, and β
reflects the average treatment effect from the policy. I expect unobservables to be randomly distributed
across individuals, or to be able to be captured by either state fixed effects or continuous time variables.
Since I have restricted our sample to people who were high school juniors between the years of 2000 and 2012,
I am identifying the effect of taking a mandatory, free ACT or SAT test on college enrollment as opposed to
needing to elect to take the test in order to attend college. I similarly identify effects on college attainment.
5 Results
5.1 College-Level Results
Using college-level IPEDS data, I examine whether admissions standards are stronger after the implemen-
tation of the policy as well as whether application, enrollment, and graduation rates are effected by the
policy. Since β reflects the change from 0% treated to 100% treated, but the average college that is treated
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is treated at 20%, the average treatment effect is 20% of the “intensity of treatment” value. This is reported
in a row labeled “Average Treatment” without t-test statistics. To clarify, “Average Treatment” is not a
separate regressor ; it is merely more easily reporting the typical treatment at the typical college from the
policy. Tables 7-9 contain the β values of model 1 showing how the admissions standards are impacted by
the policy and Table 10 contains the β values showing how enrollment and graduation patterns are impacted
by the policy. The other controls outlined in model 1 are present in these models, and more detailed results
can be found in the appendix.
In table 7, I examine the impact of the policy on the accepted ACT or SAT scores. It should be noted
that I can only view the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentile scores, rather than the true distribution of
scores accepted. This limits my distribution by only being able to approximate how the average lower-tier
and upper-tier score changes with the policy’s introduction. In columns one, three, and four, we can see that
the twenty-fifth percentile score does not change with the introduction of the policy. However, for both the
ACT and SAT, the seventy-fifth percentiles score changes. This indicates more highly qualified applicants
are being accepted to colleges with the introduction of the policy. Specifically, the seventy-fifth percentile of
the ACT is increased by 1.2 points, or approximately five percentile points, by a 100% increase in the treated
population. The typical increase from the policy, reflecting that the average college is 20% treated, is only
0.25 points, or approximately a one percentile increase in ACT scores. The policy induces an increase of 27
to 36 points on each section of the SAT for students in the seventy-fifth percentile, or roughly eight percentile
points, by a 100% increase in treated individuals. The typical treated school sees a one to two percentile
point increase in each of the two sections of the SAT, or two to four percentile points overall. The increase in
seventy-fifth percentile scores but not twenty-fifth percentile scores can indicate that more highly qualified
applicants are applying to colleges, shifting the mean and median to be higher without changing the lower
tail of the distribution. Alternatively, the college could still be accepting the same quality of lower-qualified
students who otherwise have special traits, such as being athletes or having the income to pay full tuition,
but may be increasing the standards for other students applying. The full distribution of scores would be
needed to parse out these effects.
Since the change in ACT scores is different than the change in SAT scores, I inspect if the effect on the
admissions rate is different for ACT or SAT dominant schools in table 8. I may expect that if the SAT’s
scores are changed more by the policy than the ACT’s, that SAT-dominant schools will have increased
admissions standards more than ACT-dominant schools. I define a school as being dominated by the ACT
if more students send in an ACT score than an SAT score and vice versa. I find that regardless of the
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subsample studied, there is no statistically significant change in the admissions rate. However, there is some
evidence that more highly qualified students are applying for colleges due to the policy, as reflected by the
admitted SAT scores increasing and the seventy-fifth percentile of both ACT and SAT scores increasing
when all schools are considered. The policy may be improving students’ scores themselves, but the ability
for less qualified students to get into colleges has not be adversely effected. Colleges may accept more highly
qualified students with the expectation few will matriculate, making the application process for college still
the same level of competitiveness. Merit-Based scholarships, however, may then be impacted by the policy
if more highly-qualified students are applying when treated.
Table 7: Admissions Standards: ACT and SAT Scores, All Col-
leges, IPEDS
ACT ACT SAT SAT SAT SAT
Composite Composite Maths Verbal Maths Verbal
25th 75th 25th 25th 75th 75th
Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile
Intensity of Treatment 0.799 1.257∗ 15.09 22.40 26.80∗ 34.51∗
(1.34) (2.21) (1.13) (1.41) (2.14) (2.17)
Average Treatment 0.1598 0.2514∗ 3.018 4.48 5.36∗ 7.102∗
R2 0.715 0.692 0.739 0.714 0.713 0.675
Adjusted R2 0.700 0.674 0.724 0.698 0.697 0.657
Observations 12956 12950 13089 13006 13087 13007
t statistics in parentheses. "Average Treatment" is not an additional regressor.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0001, Standard Errors Clustered by College
Table 8: Admissions Standards: Admissions Rate, Various Sub-
samples, IPEDS
Admissions Admissions Admissions Admissions Admissions Admissions
Rate Rate, ACT Rate, SAT Rate, Not Rate, Not Rate, Missing
Rate Dominant Dominant Missing Missing ACT and SAT
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All Colleges Colleges ACT Data SAT Data Data
Intensity of Treatment 0.0358 0.0555 -0.0766 0.0471 0.0306 0.0306
(1.06) (1.30) (-1.01) (1.38) (0.83) (0.83)
Average Treatment 0.00716 0.0111 -0.01532 0.00942 0.00612 0.00612
R2 0.379 0.330 0.551 0.475 0.497 0.497
Adjusted R2 0.356 0.282 0.527 0.446 0.469 0.469
Observations 19140 6506 9692 12958 13092 13092
t statistics in parentheses. "Average Treatment" is not an additional regressor.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0001, Standard Errors Clustered by College
However, rather than measuring the change in the ACT or SAT exam by a singular measure of the ACT
and SAT policy combined, I can separately measure the ACT or SAT policy. Each intensity of treatment
variable is identical except it only adds up the students historically from ACT-treated states or SAT-treated
states, respectively. Table 9 displays these results, wherein the effect of the SAT policy disappears, being
small in magnitude and insignificant. Neither policy has a statistically significant on admissions rates. The
75th percentile of the ACT scores remains statistically significant and still about 1.4 ACT points (about 10
percentile points) by a 100% increase in the treated population, while the 25th percentile score is insignificant
and small in magnitude. This is only about a two percentile score increase in the upper tail of the distribution
for the ACT for the average college, the average college being 20% treated. These results suggest that the
previously found results regarding the SAT were most likely due to the fact that the SAT policy is only
implemented in Maine in 2006, Delaware in 2010, Idaho in 2011, and North Carolina in 2012. Therefore,
most of the states implemented the ACT in the remaining years, skewing the results of the previously run
regressions. Since the most-qualified ACT scores of admitted students still increases with the policy why the
SAT does not, the previous results suggesting that the ACT and SAT colleges may be different in nature
still holds.
My results suggest that colleges did not become substantially harder to be admitted to due to the policy,
as I find no evidence of admissions rates changing. However, there is some evidence that more highly qualified
students are applying for colleges due to the policy, as reflected by the admitted SAT scores increasing and the
seventy-fifth percentile of both ACT and SAT scores increasing when all schools are considered. The policy
may be improving students’ scores themselves, but the ability for less qualified students to get into colleges
23
has not be adversely effected. Colleges may accept more highly qualified students with the expectation few
will matriculate, making the application process for college still the same level of competitiveness. Merit-
Based scholarships, however, may then be impacted by the policy if more highly-qualified students are
applying when treated.
Table 9: Admissions Standards: Separate ACT and SAT Treat-
ments, IPEDS Results
Admission ACT ACT SAT SAT SAT SAT
Rate Composite Composite Maths Verbal Maths Verbal
(Percent) 25th 75th 25th 25th 75th 75th
Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile
Intensity to 0.0428 0.872 1.361∗
Treat ACT (1.13) (1.37) (2.19)
Average Treatment ACT 0.00856 0.1744 0.2722∗
Intensity to -0.00571 -2.979 -2.910 -8.450 -3.535
Treat SAT (-0.09) (-0.13) (-0.10) (-0.38) (-0.13)
Average Treatment SAT -0.5958 -0.582 -1.69 -0.707
R2 0.379 0.715 0.692 0.738 0.713 0.712 0.674
Adjusted R2 0.356 0.700 0.674 0.724 0.698 0.696 0.656
Observations 19140 12956 12950 13089 13006 13087 13007
t statistics in parentheses. "Average Treatment" is not an additional regressor.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0001, Standard Errors Clustered by College
Since perhaps ACT and SAT states are different in nature, and therefore I control for whether or not
a college is an ACT or SAT dominant school in analysis of application, enrollment, and graduation trends
(Table 10). It should be noted that this parameter is never statistically significant nor large in magnitude.
As seen in table 10, enrollment did increase as colleges had more treated students, on average by about
443 enrolled students if the percent treated increases by 100%. For the typical college, this is an increase
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in 88 students. Considering the average number of students is 401, this is a substantial increase. However,
our data is extremely skewed. While the mean number of enrolled freshmen students is 401, the standard
deviation is 785. The effect on the applicants, while only statistically significant at the 10% rather than 5%
level, also increased by an average of 2,378 students per college if the percent treated increases by 100%.
For the typical college, this is an increase in 475 applicants. The average number of applicants to a college
is 2,586, so this is also a substantial increase. Similarly the applicants are skewed as well, with a standard
deviation of 5,407 in comparison to its mean of 2,586. Since applicants increased substantially more than
enrollment numbers, it is also likely students may have applied to a wider variety of schools rather than
only more students applying to college. However, given the data is at the college-level, it is difficult to parse
out if more students were applying to colleges but choosing not to go or if students were applying to more
colleges.
Table 10: Applicantion, Enrollment, and Completion, IPEDS Re-
sults
Applicants Enrolled Students Graduation Rate
Intensity of Treatment 2377.8+ 442.7∗ 0.0374
(1.68) (2.04) (0.91)
Average Treatment 475.56 88.54 0.00748
R2 0.553 0.601 0.728
Adjusted R2 0.533 0.583 0.716
Observations 16192 16175 9987
t statistics in parentheses. "Average Treatment" is not an additional regressor.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0001, Standard Errors Clustered by College
5.2 Individual-Level Results
In Table 11, I examine differing estimations of the treatment effect by changing the subsample studied.
Strangely, the significance of the effect is highly dependent on what subsample is studied. If only freshmen-
aged individuals (0 to 2 years out of high school) are examined, the effect is only significant at the 10% level
if individuals listed as dependents are studied. The effect size is also rather small; if an individual lived in a
treated state when they are a junior in high school (“is treated”), they have 1.03 times the odds of attending
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college than an individual who was not treated. Once people who are not listed as dependents in the survey
are included in this sample, the effect size and significance disappears. Contrastingly, when examining all
college-aged individuals, there is no statistically significant effect of treatment on dependents. However, when
examining all college-aged individuals, treated individuals have 1.03 times the odds of attending college as
non-treated individuals. When examining all people who are 18 or older, there is no effect of the treatment
in magnitude or significance on college attendance.
In Table 12, I examine college attainment outcomes after restricting the sample size to individuals of at
least the age to have completed a college degree in four years after high school graduation. Interestingly, the
treatment increases both the odds of being a college dropout and college graduate, and increases the odds of
being a college dropout more. Treated individuals have 1.09 times the odds of being a college dropout and
1.07 times the odds of being a college graduate as non-treated individuals. This is hard to reconcile with
the previous results that suggested that if college attendance was increased by the policy, it was marginally
at best. All college-bound individuals can only either dropout or graduate from college, so these effect sizes
should agree with the result that there is no overall effect on being enrolled in college when including all
individuals in the sample.
While it is ideal to analyze the effects on the individual level, the nature of our data makes it too
difficult to control for enough factors to isolate the effects of the policy. I cannot even observe the income
of the individual’s parents (unless they are listed as dependents, as is true in the first two columns of
Table 11), what type of neighborhood they come from, or any other personal characteristics beyond the
very basic demographic factors of ethnicity, disability, citizenship, and gender. While standard controls,
these basic social characteristics hardly adequately capture the complex factors influencing an individual’s
decision to attend college. Additionally, college attendance in competitive and non-competitive college is not
differentiated, so it is impossible to see if people are going to competitive colleges more but non-competitive
colleges less. The previously discussed issues of identifying if individuals are treated in reality are much larger
for the individual-level data than the college-level data, and thus the measurement errors in approximating
the treatment may be too large to isolate any effects.
Note these are odds ratios interpretations in tables 11 and 12 (we have already converted log odds ratios
to odds ratios). For example, the odds of any college-aged student being enrolled in college given a student
takes the free ACT or SAT is 1.03 times the odds that a student is contemporaneously enrolled in college
that must elect to take the ACT or SAT.
Additionally, it is useful to see if different populations are differently effected by the policy. More
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Table 11: Enrollment, ACS Data
Freshmen-Aged Freshmen-Aged College-Aged College-Aged Post-High
Dependents All Dependents All School Aged
Enrollment Enrollment Enrollment Enrollment Enrollment
Treated 1.0262+ 0.9930 1.0140 1.0318∗∗ 1.0016
(0.0141) (0.0120) (0.0102) (0.0086) (0.0071)
Observations 575995 890902 1132099 1960499 3230912
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.062 0.056 0.044 0.068
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12: College Attainment, ACS Data
College Dropout College Graduate
Post-College Age Post-College Age
Treated 1.0915∗∗ 1.0744∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0124)
Observations 1588882 1588882
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.084
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
specifically, I would suspect that if offering the ACT or SAT for free was driving change in behavior, i.e.
that students could not afford to take the exam, poorer students would be more effected by the policy. I
test this by interacting treatment with race and parental income. When I add these interaction terms, I
surprisingly find that there’s essentially no statistically significant impact of parental income interacted with
the policy. The policy has the same impact on wealthy and poor students. At the 10% level, it is possible
that the policy interacted with being upper middle income ($50,000-$75,000) increases the odds of attending
college in comparison to being extremely wealthy (over $250,000 income) for college-aged individuals (but
not freshmen-aged). Beyond this, none of the interacted income terms have a statistically significant impact.
The interacted effects of race are similar. For freshmen-aged individuals, there are only statistically
significant impacts on individuals who are Japanese or “Other Race”. The effects of being Japanese are due
to the extremely small sample size of Japanese individuals, wherein only one-tenth of a percent of treated
individuals are Japanese. Students who are other race and treated are less likely to attend college than white
individuals who are treated. What groups other race precisely comprises of is unclear, since multiracial is
an option on the survey. Therefore, these effects may be picking up more on the uniqueness of individual
who distrusts the Census and chooses not to report their race. Additionally, when inspecting the regressions
for college-aged rather than only freshmen-aged individuals, Black individuals are also less likely to attend
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college when treated than White individuals who are treated. These results suggest that the policy may not
be targeting racial minorities effectively, despite NCLB’s and the policy’s hopes of impacting minorities who
are less likely to attend college. However, evidence for this is extremely limited, and it seems more likely the
policy roughly equally impacted different socioeconomic statuses.
Table 13: Enrollment, ACS Data, Interacted
Freshmen Freshmen Freshmen College College College
Aged Aged Aged Aged Aged Aged
Dependents Dependents Dependents Dependents Dependents Dependents
Interact Interact Interact Interact
Income Race Income Race
Treated 1.0226 0.9881 1.0426∗∗ 1.0116 0.9477 1.0353∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0652) (0.0157) (0.0103) (0.0468) (0.0115)
White 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Black 0.8278∗∗ 0.8278∗∗ 0.8325∗∗ 0.8325∗∗ 0.8325∗∗ 0.8396∗∗
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0105) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0072)
Native American 0.6116∗∗ 0.6116∗∗ 0.6048∗∗ 0.5896∗∗ 0.5896∗∗ 0.5857∗∗
(0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0237) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0161)
Chinese 2.8415∗∗ 2.8414∗∗ 2.8653∗∗ 3.0861∗∗ 3.0861∗∗ 3.1074∗∗
(0.1177) (0.1178) (0.1222) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0897)
Japanese 1.8353∗∗ 1.8360∗∗ 1.9772∗∗ 1.9700∗∗ 1.9697∗∗ 2.0419∗∗
(0.1918) (0.1917) (0.2124) (0.1369) (0.1368) (0.1448)
Other Asian 1.9875∗∗ 1.9879∗∗ 1.9972∗∗ 2.0003∗∗ 2.0003∗∗ 1.9968∗∗
(0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0452) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0302)
Other race, nec 0.9177∗∗ 0.9177∗∗ 0.9293∗∗ 0.9160∗∗ 0.9160∗∗ 0.9269∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0119)
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Two major races 0.9564∗ 0.9563∗ 0.9558∗ 1.0045 1.0045 1.0047
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0210) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0156)
Three or more major races 0.9160 0.9159 0.9139 0.9656 0.9655 0.9588
(0.0585) (0.0585) (0.0601) (0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0436)
Family Income Over $250,000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Family Income Under $250,000, 1.0614∗ 1.0669∗∗ 1.0615∗ 0.9490∗∗ 0.9470∗∗ 0.9487∗∗
Over $150,000 (0.0248) (0.0262) (0.0248) (0.0158) (0.0165) (0.0158)
Family Income Under $150,000, 0.8903∗∗ 0.8861∗∗ 0.8902∗∗ 0.7654∗∗ 0.7607∗∗ 0.7652∗∗
Over $100,000 (0.0190) (0.0199) (0.0190) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0117)
Family Income Under $100,000, 0.7141∗∗ 0.7121∗∗ 0.7141∗∗ 0.5996∗∗ 0.5967∗∗ 0.5995∗∗
Over $75,000 (0.0153) (0.0160) (0.0153) (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0092)
Family Income Under $75,000, 0.5696∗∗ 0.5670∗∗ 0.5696∗∗ 0.4813∗∗ 0.4775∗∗ 0.4813∗∗
Over $50,000 (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0120) (0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0073)
Family Income Under $50,000, 0.4341∗∗ 0.4328∗∗ 0.4340∗∗ 0.3748∗∗ 0.3733∗∗ 0.3747∗∗
Over $25,000 (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0092) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0057)
Family Income Under $25,000, 0.3270∗∗ 0.3245∗∗ 0.3269∗∗ 0.2891∗∗ 0.2871∗∗ 0.2891∗∗
over $10,000 (0.0074) (0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0047)
Family Income Under $10,000 0.2948∗∗ 0.2956∗∗ 0.2949∗∗ 0.2672∗∗ 0.2662∗∗ 0.2673∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0077) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0049)
Family Income Over $250,000 1.0000 1.0000
× Treated (.) (.)
Family Income Under $250,000, 0.9471 1.0272
Over $150,000 × Treated (0.0756) (0.0604)
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Family Income Under $150,000, 1.0531 1.0777
Over $100,000 × Treated (0.0759) (0.0579)
Family Income Under $100,000, 1.0315 1.0612
Over $75,000 × Treated (0.0752) (0.0576)
Family Income Under $75,000, 1.0528 1.1047+
Over $50,000 × Treated (0.0754) (0.0590)
Family Income Under $50,000, 1.0305 1.0481
Over $25,000 × Treated (0.0738) (0.0559)
Family Income Under $25,000, 1.0961 1.0903
Over $10,000 × Treated (0.0841) (0.0625)
Family Income Under $10,000 0.9636 1.0419
× Treated (0.0847) (0.0681)
White 1.0000 1.0000
× Treated (.) (.)
Black 0.9353 0.8966∗∗
× Treated (0.0385) (0.0268)
Native American 1.3192 1.2133
× Treated (0.2236) (0.1516)
Chinese 0.8758 0.8874
× Treated (0.1555) (0.1171)
Japanese 0.2083∗∗ 0.4075∗
× Treated (0.0915) (0.1464)
Other Asian 0.9346 1.0531
× Treated (0.0804) (0.0643)
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Other race, nec 0.8347∗∗ 0.8405∗∗
× Treated (0.0513) (0.0365)
Two major races 1.0136 1.0031
× Treated (0.0777) (0.0565)
Three or more major races 1.0738 1.1590
× Treated (0.2873) (0.2316)
Observations 575995 575995 575995 1132099 1132099 1132099
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.063
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
6 Conclusion
6.1 Summary
Based upon the more reliable college-level results, there is some evidence that enrollment and applications to
college increased without an adverse effects on graduation rates. Students are likely underestimating their
own abilities to apply to and succeed in college, deciding to not even take the exam early in the process. A
2004 survey showing that 32% of urban seniors had taken either the ACT or SAT, while 98% of suburban
students had (Avery and Kane 2004). This suggests that many students in areas that do not have a strong
college culture do not believe they are capable of succeeding on the exam well enough to be competitive in the
college admissions process. My results suggest this is true, as not only the application to but also enrollment
in college increases from the increase in applicants taking a mandatory ACT or SAT exam. Furthermore,
there is little evidence to suggest that colleges have been modifying their admissions standards in response to
more students applying to and attending college. My limited evidence may suggest that more highly-qualified
students are applying to and being accepted to colleges, particularly ACT colleges, but that lower-qualified
students are not being adversely effected by this shift. This means that any students who are induced to
take the exam via the policy are not entering into a substantially more difficult college competition process
than students in untreated states.
From a policy standpoint, this means the tests likely worked in the way they were intended: increasing
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college applications and enrollment without harming students’ chances to be competitive in the admissions
process or succeed in college. Additionally, my results add further evidence to the literature that students
often have imperfect information and assumptions when navigating the college admissions process. If students
were better able to gage their own abilities to be competitive in the college application process, forcing them
to take the ACT or SAT exam for free should have little to no effect on college application rates because the
instantaneous costs should not dramatically change the students’ decision making process. Future education
policy reforms can take this possibility into account more, seeking out ways to either give students more
information or nudge their behavior with small gestures like a free college admissions exam.
6.2 Future Analysis
As previously discussed, my individual-level analysis has many issues with measurement accuracy and ade-
quate control variables. Since college-level analysis cannot tell what types of students are being induced to
attend colleges, it would be useful if future analysis could more accurately use individual data. This could be
gained from proprietary data that tracks student outcomes for those who take the exam. Additionally, while
my analysis suggested there was a difference between SAT and ACT states, it did not adequately explore
this difference further or the differences between individual state policies. While some of these differences are
discussed in the appendix, an empirical analysis of the differences would be useful to parse out the different
effects between mandating the ACT or SAT and offering it for free. For example, the inclusion or exclu-
sion of pre-exams in students’ freshmen and sophomore years would be an additional modification to the
student’s decision model, as they would have data on their likelihood to be qualified to attend college much
earlier in their high school career. This creates a college centric culture much earlier in the student’s life, as
well as gives them the opportunity to change their habits if they are not performing as well as they would
like as early as freshman year. High school-level data, or exploiting the differences between the pre-tests
mandated by state policies, would be useful to do this type of analysis. My analysis suggest that while
the majority of the college application process requires initiative on the part of the student , students do
this without necessarily understanding the full cost-benefits analysis of applying. More rigorously analyzing
differences between schools or states is necessary to conclude if students behavior is being primarily changed
by additional information earlier in their high school career or by waiving the test fee itself.
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8 Appendix
8.1 A Model for the College Application and Enrollment Decisions of a Student
I use a variation of a worker’s learning model to describe how the student makes her college attainment
decisions. The crux of the model is that the student may be uncertain of her true ability and her test
score in a college-entry test and the colleges’ acceptance decisions may provide her more information about
her unknown true ability. The status quo pre-adoption of the policy is that students must opt to take
a college entrance exam, requiring they already have the notion that they may be successful enough in a
competitive college13 to make taking the exam worth the physical, opportunity, and psychological costs.
Under the policy, the student knows more information from the exam’s score about her abilities to better
optimize her college decision. Additionally, the policy reduces the physical costs associated with taking the
exam are reduced to zero, decreasing the costs associated with test taking. Thirdly, the policy may induce
schools to teach-to-the-test, evidence for which is presented in section 8.2.1, reducing the student’s costs in
exam preparation and potentially improving her scores. Lastly, the policy may impact colleges acceptance
probabilities because it may change the characteristics and size of the applicant pool.
I will start by drawing a time line of the student’s decision problem which unfolds over a finite horizon.
I then present the student’s decision problem in each period.
8.1.1 The Student’s Decision Time Line
The student’s decision timeline without the policy in place is outlined in figure 4, and the modification of
her decision is illustrated in figure 5. The timeline for her college decision process begins in the spring of
her junior year or fall of her senior year, denoted as period one (t = 1). This is when she chooses whether to
take a college entry exam. If she takes the exam, she learns about her own abilities from her standardized
test score (denoted s). In mid to late fall senior year, period two (t = 2), she decides whether to apply to
a competitive college, noncompetitive college, or no college. A competitive college is defined as any college
that requires a college entrance exam, so if she did not decide to take a college entrance exam, this option is
not available to her. If the student applies to a competitive college during period 2, she gains learns about
her abilities again from the colleges’ acceptance decision early spring senior year. Accordingly, period three
(t = 3) correspond to the spring of her senior when she deicides whether to enroll in college or go to the
workforce. The final period (t = 4, not shown) in the student’s horizon comprises of the post-high school
13Again, competitive college reflects colleges requiring the ACT or SAT to be admitted versus being open enrollment.
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years.
8.1.2 The Student’s Initial Conditions
At the start of her decision horizon (spring of junior year, early fall of senior year) a student is characterized
by her innate ability (denoted by θ), her perceptions of her ability (denoted by fθ0 (.)), and her parent’s
characteristics (denoted by I) which include the student’s state of residence during her high school years.
Both innate ability and parent’s characteristics are assumed to be time invariant; the former is not known
to the student while the latter is. That is, all the student knows is that her ability is a draw from the
probability distribution function (pdf) fθ0 (.) where the subscript “0” reflects the fact that this pdf captures
the student’s beliefs at the start of t = 1. These beliefs may evolve over time as information is received.
8.1.3 The Student’s Decision Problem
Consider a student at the start of period t = 1. Her information set contains Ω0 =
(
I, f0θ (.)
)
and the
indicator D which denotes the policy scenario: D = 1 when the college-entry test is free and mandatory and
zero otherwise. The student makes decision sequentially over time. Likewise information is revealed over
time depending on the choices made by the student and the colleges.
The Student’s Test Taking Decision at the Start of Period t = 1 In the spring of junior year /
early fall of senior year (t = 1), a student chooses whether to take a college-entry test in order to maximize
her life-time utility: ds = 1 if she takes the test, zero otherwise. Formally, given (Ω0, D), the student solves
this problem:
max
ds∈{0,1}
u1 (d
s;D) +W1 (Ω0, d
s;D) (3)
where u1 (ds;D) andW1 (ds,Ω0;D) are, respectively, the instantaneous (indirect) utility and the continuation
utility values associated with choice alternative ds under policy regime D. When the entry-college test is not
free (D = 0), u1 (ds; 1) captures the monetary, time, and psychological costs of taking the test: any charge
connected with and time spent preparing for the test (e.g. tutorials), the fees charged by the company that
administers the test, the monetary and time expenses to go to the testing location, the fear of receiving a
poor score, etc.. When taking the test is free and mandatory (D = 1), I let ds∗ = 1 for all students. This
reflect that taking the test is no longer a choice. The monetary costs of the exam itself have been reduced
to zero, and many extraneous costs such as studying have likely also been supplemented by the school.
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Figure 4:
Student’s Decision Without Policy
Figure 5:
Student’s Decision With Policy
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The Student’s Test Score Realization at the End of Period t = 1 At the end of period t = 1 a
student who chose to take the college-entry test learns her test score. The test score is a noisy measure of
the student’s ability:
s = µ+ ε (4)
where ε is the noise. The student observes the realization of T but does not know either µ or ε, that is, ε
is a random variable. Because the test score depends on µ, it contains information about a student innate
ability. Accordingly, the student uses such information to update her beliefs about her ability. If the student
presumes that the policy itself improves her test score in the form of teaching to the test, then the test score
is an even noisier measure of her true ability:
s = µ+ αD + ε (5)
where α is the change in test score, for given student’s ability, due to the school’s response to the policy. I
assume that α is known to the student.
Regardless if she chooses to take the exam or takes it due to the policy, she updates her beliefs accordingly.
Therefore, we have that fθ1 (.) 6= fθ0 (.) if and only if she took the college entrance exam and therefore knows
more information regarding her true abilities. Otherwise, perception of her abilities remains unchanged.
The Student’s College Application Decision at the Start of Period t = 2 At the start of period
t = 2 the information set of a student contains Ω1 =
(
I, fθ1 (.) , d
s, s
)
and D. Let dp denote the student’s
college application choice, which has three options: apply to competitive colleges (dp = 2), non-competitive
colleges (dp = 1), or not to apply to college (dp = 0). A student who did not take the college entry test
(ds = 0) can only apply to non-competitive colleges or choose not to apply to college by definition. A student
optimizes:
max
dp∈{0,1,2}
u2 (d
p) + E [W2 (Ω2;D) |Ω1, dp] (6)
where u2 (dp) and E [W2 (Ω2;D) |Ω1, dp] are, respectively, the instantaneous and continuation utility values
associated with choice alternative dp under policy regime D, and Ω2 ≡ (Ω1, dp, da). I think of u2 (1) as
capturing the financial and time costs associated with applying to colleges (e.g. fees, preparing a personal
statement, polishing one’s CV, visiting campuses etc.). Accordingly, I normalize u2 (0) to zero. Observe that
these costs are policy-invariant, that is, D is not an argument of u2 (.). The expectation term is present to
reflect that at the time when the student applies to colleges she does not know whether her application will
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be accepted (da = 1) or rejected (da = 0), as outlined in the next paragraph.
The College’s Acceptance Decision at the end of Period t = 2 I let da denote the college’s acceptance
choice, such that the college can either accept the student’s application (da = 1) or reject it (da = 0). If a
student applies to a non-competitive college, da = 1 by definition. Therefore, a college’s admissions decision
is represented as follows:
Pr(da = 1|s, fθ1 (.) , dp;D) =
 1 if d
p = 1
pa
(
s, fθ1 (.) ;D
)
if dp = 2
(7)
where pa
(
s, fθ1 (.) ;D
)
is the probability (possibly less than one) that a student with test scores s is admitted
by a competitive college under policy regimeD. I can write out the continuation value E [W2 (Ω2;D) |Ω1, dp]as
follows:
E [W2 (Ω2;D) |Ω1, dp] =

W2 (Ω1, d
p, 0;D) if dp = 0
W2 (Ω1, d
p, 1;D) if dp = 1
pa
(
s, fθ1 (.) ;D
)
W2 (Ω1, d
p, 1;D) +(
1− pa (s, fθ1 (.) ;D))W2 (Ω1, dp, 0;D) if dp = 2
(8)
The second row of equation 8 reflects the fact that admission is guaranteed to a student who applies to a
non-competitive college. Thus, the continuation value associated with applying to college is that associated
with being admitted to such college (which is why the last argument of W2 (., ., .;D) is set to zero). The
third and last row of equation 8 reflects the fact that when a student applies to a competitive college she
is accepted with probability pa
(
s, fθ1 (.) ;D
)
. Thus, the continuation value of this choice alternative is a
weighted average of the value from being admitted (namely W2 (Ω1, dp, 1;D)) and of not being admitted
(namely W2 (Ω1, dp, 0;D)) where the weights are the acceptance (namely pa
(
s, fθ1 (.) ;D
)
) and rejection
probabilities (namely
(
1− pa (s, fθ1 (.) ;D))). She learns additional information about her abilities if and
only if dp = 2 because the acceptance decision only varies if the student is applying to a competitive college.
Therefore, this is the only instance where fθ2 (.) 6= fθ1 (.). Otherwise, perception of her abilities remains
unchanged.
The College Enrollment Decision at t = 3 At the start of period t = 3 (the spring of the senior
year) the information set of a student is Ω3 =
(
I, fθ2 (.) , d
s, s, dp, da
)
. Let de denote the student’s college
enrollment choice, where she can either enroll (de = 1) or not (de = 0). Trivially, if dp = 0, then de = 0.
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Consider next a student who applied to a college (dp∗ ∈ {1, 2}) and was accepted (da∗ = 1). Given (Ω3, D)
she chooses whether to enroll as to maximize her life-time utility. Formally, she solves the following problem:
max
de∈{0,1}
u3 (d
e) +W3 (Ω3, d
e;D) (9)
where u3 (de) and W3 (Ω3, de;D) are, respectively, the instantaneous and continuation utility values associ-
ated with choice alternative dp under policy regime D. I think of u3 (1) as related to psychic costs (e.g. from
not attending college when the students peers do so) or up-front monetary costs related to going to college
(e.g. moving costs). I accordingly normalize u3 (0) to zero.
The Post-High School Continuation Value at t = 4 At the start of period t = 4 (the end of high
school) the information set of a student contains Ω4 = (Ω3, de) and D. I do not explicitly model the
continuation value post-high school. Instead, for a student of ability µ I simply represent it with
V4
(
de, fθ2 (.) , µ;D
)
(10)
which is to be interpreted as the utility value that a student with characteristics
(
de, fθ2 (.) , µ
)
commands
at the time she graduates from high school under policy regime D. The dependence of this utility value on(
de, fθ2 (.) , µ
)
reflects the following pathways. The dependence on de captures the fact that the returns to
college in terms of earnings may be positive and differentiated based on the competitiveness of the college
attended, that competitive and non-competitive colleges charge a (possibly differentiated) tuition, and that
by attending college a student forgoes labor market earnings for a few years. The dependence on fθ2 (.)
captures the fact that a student may choose different occupations based on her perceived ability, and returns
to education (hence earnings) may differ by occupation. The dependence on true ability reflects the fact
that it is a determinant of the student’s productivity in the labor market hence of her life-time earnings. Her
ability to complete her education is also a function of her ability, impacting her long-term labor earnings.
Finally, the dependence on D reflects any general equilibrium effects of the policy. For instance, if more
students are induced to go to college the supply of college-educated workers increases and this may affect
earnings. The student does not know µ, thus, standing at the start of period t = 4, her expected future
utility is the expected value of V4
(
de, fθ2 (.) , µ;D
)
taken with respect to true ability, that is, using fθ2 (.) as
the pdf for the integration:
W3 (Ω3, d
e;D) ≡ E [V4 (de, fθ2 (.) , µ;D) |Ω4] (11)
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8.1.4 The Model Solution
A model solution needs to be constructed in future study. Given parametric and functional form assump-
tions, the above model can be solved by backward recursion. The model provides a conceptual framework
for how I expect the policy to impact college application and enrollment. I expect that a student gains
information regarding her own ability by being forced to take the exam, giving her the option to apply
for and attend competitive university. Additionally, I expect that more students will be substituting away
from non-competitive college to attend competitive college than substituting away from the workforce to
attend competitive college. This creates problems when trying to measure competitive college attendance
with a measure that includes non-competitive college attendance, as is true in the individual-level empirical
analysis.
The likelihood of more students enrolling in colleges depends on whether the information given by the
exam induces more students to accurately believe they are more prepared for college than they would have
without taking the exam. If students under-predict their own abilities, and the noise on the SAT or ACT as
predictors of college success is minimal, then the policy should inform more students that they are qualified
to attend college. However, if students are do not under-predict their own abilities, then the SAT or ACT
would minimally change their self-perception. Additionally, if the SAT or ACT are extremely noisy to the
extent they tell students their abilities are less than the student’s prior, then the policy would not induce
more students to go to college.
8.2 Additional Policy and Data Information
8.2.1 Detailed Information on Policies
Between the years 2001 and 2015, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia implemented a policy
providing mandatory and free college admissions exams to all public high school juniors during the school
day (typically a Wednesday in April or May of their junior year). These policies do not apply to students in
private schools, but since approximately 90% of the US K-12 population throughout the 2000s has attended
public K-12 education, we will treat all individuals as though they went to public school. Furthermore,
since we are primarily concerned with the effects on low income or rural students, these populations tend
to attend public school, and thus are more likely to be accurately deemed as treated. Students attending
private schools are relatively likely to take the ACT and attend university irrespective of treatment, so we
do not expect change in their numbers.
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I will be treating the ACT and SAT tests as the same treatment, unlike many previous studies have done.
While we list states that adopted the policy post-2012 since these states could be incorporated in further
analysis with more data, only states with at least two years of the policy (thus allowing juniors to complete
their senior year and be in at least their first year of college) are included in our sample.
Taking a pre-college entrance exam in the student’s freshman or sophomore year is likely to help improve
their score and give the student more information about their true ability earlier on in their high school career.
Furthermore, the pre-SAT (PSAT) is also a scholarship competition, so any students doing exceptionally
well will be further incentivized by cheaper college.
The individual states’ policies in detail:
Illinois: Beginning in spring of 2001, all Illinois juniors take the ACT exam in school. Students are not
charged to take the exam. Starting in 2008, Illinois started offering the preparatory pre-tests to the ACT
(EXPLORE and PLAN tests) to all high school freshmen and sophomores, respectively, free of charge. This
increases student preparation for the exam. Many districts offered these exams before the state policy. As
the ACT was used as a component of No Child Left Behind mandates, districts are evaluated based upon
their act pass rates. In 2015, the policy was modified to be the SAT instead of ACT, but since our data does
not extend this far, it does not effect our analysis.
Colorado: Beginning in spring of 2001, all Colorado juniors take the ACT exam in school. Students are
not charged to take the exam. Many districts offer the EXPLORE and Plan exam, but there is no official
state policy. This is explicitly because the Colorado Department of Education found that state-created exams
were no worse at predicting ACT performance than the ACT company’s EXPLORE or Plan exam (Huchton
2011), and thus found no need to purchase additional exams. As the ACT was used as a component of No
Child Left Behind mandates, districts are evaluated based upon their act pass rates. In 2015, the policy was
modified to be the SAT instead of ACT.
Maine: Beginning in spring 2006, all Maine juniors take the SAT for free. This replaced the previous
school assessment test under No Child Left Behind, and thus Maine high schools were evaluated based upon
their students’ performance on the exam. Additionally, the PSAT (akin to the Explore/Plan test, a pre-SAT
test given to sophomores) became state-provided and mandatory for all high school sophomores in autumn
2006. Thus, the first test taken by those who had taken both the PSAT and SAT was in spring 2007. The
policy has since been revoked as of 2015, but since my data does not extend this far, it is irrelevant to my
analysis.
Wyoming: Beginning in spring 2007, all Wyoming juniors take the ACT. Students also take the EX-
43
PLORE test in the ninth grade and PLAN test in the tenth to prepare for the ACT. The ACT and pre-ACT
exams replace state exams, and thus are used to fulfill NCLB standards of adequate yearly progress.
Michigan: Beginning in spring 2007, all Michigan juniors take the ACT. This replaced the previous
school assessment test under No Child Left Behind, and thus Michigan high schools were evaluated based
upon their students’ performance on the exam. Michigan did not choose to use the EXPLORE or Plan
exam until 2012. In 2012, a pilot project testing the EXPLORE and Plan tests was implemented, but these
students would be too young to be present in our dataset regardless. The EXPLORE test is also taken only
in the eighth grade instead of the ninth grade.
Kentucky: Beginning in spring 2008, all Kentucky juniors take the ACT for free. This policy was
accompanied by the mandatory and free explore and plan tests. Thus, beginning in spring 2008, all eighth
graders and freshmen take the EXPLORE test, all sophomores take the PLAN tests, and all juniors the
ACT. This replaced the previous school assessment test under No Child Left Behind, and thus Kentucky
high schools were evaluated based upon their students’ performance on the exam. Additionally, if students
taking the test do not reach “college readiness” benchmarks, then they are given the opportunity to have
additional learning and re-take the test for free as a senior. This is importantly not true in other states.
North Dakota: Beginning in spring 2010, all North Dakota juniors take the ACT for free. Neither the
EXPLORE nor Plan exam are required, though some individual districts may still use them.
Tennessee: Beginning in spring 2010, all Tennessee juniors take the ACT for free. Additionally, all
freshmen take the EXPLORE test and all sophomores the Plan test.
Delaware: Beginning in spring 2011, all Delaware juniors take the SAT for free. The PSAT is taken in
the tenth grade.
Idaho: Beginning in spring 2012, all high school juniors can take the SAT for free. To graduate, they
must take either the ACT or SAT, but the SAT is free and in-school. Those who wish to can take the ACT
on their own time instead and use it in lieu of the SAT. The PSAT is not mandated.
North Carolina: Beginning in spring 2012, all North Carolina juniors take the ACT for free. The
EXPLORE and Plan tests are also taken.
More states began offering the policy after spring of 2013, but I am unable to study them.
Therefore, a condensed list from which we can look at both “potentially currently enrolled people” and
“potential college graduates” from each state after treatment for individual-level data:
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Table 14: Policy Timing in Each State
State Type
of
Exam
Policy
Year
Observe
Freshmen
Enrollment
Numbers in
IPEDS
Observe
Graduation
Numbers
(within 6
years) in
IPEDS
First Year to
Identify if
Enrolled in
University in
ACS
First Year to
Identify if
Graduated
from
University in
ACS
Illinois ACT 2001 2002 2008 2003 2007
Colorado ACT 2001 2002 2008 2003 2007
Maine SAT 2006 2007 2013 2008 2012
Wyoming ACT 2007 2008 N/A 2009 2013
Michigan ACT 2007 2008 N/A 2009 2013
Kentucky ACT 2008 2009 N/A 2010 2014
North
Dakota
ACT 2010 2011 N/A 2012 N/A
Tennessee ACT 2010 2011 N/A 2012 N/A
Delaware SAT 2011 2012 N/A 2013 N/A
Idaho SAT 2012 2013 N/A 2014 N/A
North
Carolina
SAT 2012 2013 N/A 2014 N/A
8.2.2 Other potential policies not included
In addition to the previously described states, Arkansas offered a free but not mandatory ACT exam starting
in spring of 2009. However, because of my own hypothesis that the mandatory part is even more important
than the free part of the policy, I opt not to include Arkansas in my analysis. This would be an interesting
state to add for future analysis as a state where the students’ costs have been reduced to zero but students
but still choose to take the exam.
Additionally, while I researched for state-wide initiatives to implement this policy, some individual school
districts choose to implement similar policies as well. While it is impossible to know without large amounts
of primary source research precisely how many school districts choose to mandate the ACT or SAT. For
example, Portland Public Schools requires the ACT, even though other school districts in the Portland
metro area and Oregon as a whole do not. This is again not included in my analysis because it would be
impossible to know which students specifically graduated from Portland Public Schools.
Due to the decentralized nature of the American public education system, these policies take on different
names and can exist in any school district despite overall state policy. Given enough time and resources one
could research if every school district decided to adopt a similar policy, but this would require significant
time to thoroughly examine all school systems. There may be some students mis-labeled as not treated
under both the college and individual-level analysis as a result, but the effect should be minimal because the
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majority of school districts in the United States did not opt to develop the policy on their own without a
state mandate. This is particularly true when considering that the majority of states developed this policy
in response to NCLB, wherein all states must develop a statewide measure of adequate yearly progress.
Individual school districts cannot develop their own measure, so any school districts who adopt the policy in
untreated states are doing so because they believe it is valuable to their students and not to fulfill statewide
testing mandates. Therefore, there is less of an incentive beyond philosophical beliefs for individual school
districts to adopt a relatively costly policy, since they must not only pay for every student to take the exam
but also opt for a day of instruction to be spent taking the exam, so we expect that few school districts in
untreated states adopted the policy on their own.
8.2.3 Strength of the Never Moving Assumption
For the individual-level analysis, I treat people as having gone to high school in the location they lived in
as of one year prior to the survey, under the assumption people rarely move, and if they move, they do not
move particularly often. As of 2011, we have data as to what percentage of college students attended college
in-state, and as of 2012, the percentage of people in a state who never move (more details below):
Table 15: Strength of Never Moving Assumption
State Percent of College Goers to Stay In State Percent of People Who Stay In State Born In
Illinois 65% 65%
Colorado 75% 64%
Maine 71% 63%
Wyoming 96% 42%
Michigan 81% 72%
Kentucky 80% 69%
North Dakota 86% 47%
Tennessee 70% 71%
Delaware 73% 61%
Idaho 75% 59%
North Carolina 83% 75%
(Data from: Gebeloff, Aisch and Quealy, 2014, summarizing Census data)
Therefore, in all states studied, the vast majority of college students attend college in-state, and the vast
majority of adults still stay in the state they were born in. However, college-educated individuals are still
the most likely to move from their home state, and these numbers are still low enough to make me doubt
that I am correctly identifying if individuals were treated. Specifically, 60% of college graduates have lived
in more than one state nationwide while only 34% of those with a high school diploma or less have (Cohn
and Morin 2008) according to a 2008 Pew Research poll. This means college graduates specifically are the
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individuals we are most likely to mis-label as growing up in the state they currently reside in.
8.2.4 Missing Data in IPEDS
As can be easily noticed in the regression results that for several outcome variables, the sample size changes
depending on the outcome variable studied. Graduation rate decreases in sample size because the froward-
looking 6-year graduation rate is the outcome variable, and this is only available for years 2008 and prior.
This can be easily seen by examining table 22, which includes complete regression results minus state effects.
The percentage of students who choose to send in ACT or SAT scores is missing for 14,287 observations
(when year + school are considered unique identifiers of an observation). Those with missing data skews
towards for profit institutions, with 68% of the observations with missing data being for-profit institutions
while only 29% of our competitive colleges14 are for-profit institutions. Most of our missing data comes not
from missing outcome variables, however, because applicants and enrollment are only missing for 975 and
748 observations, respectively. Instead, our pre-treatment characteristics are missing for a large portion of
the data, with 7,293 observations not having pre-treatment racial characteristics information, for example. I
sacrifice sample size in order to maintain the data on pre-treatment characteristics of the colleges. Like the
missing ACT and SAT data, colleges that are missing pre-treatment characteristics are substantially more
likely to be for profit (53%) and private (88%). Since these are the colleges I expect to be the least impacted
by the policy, I believe the effects of the missing data should be minimal. Future analysis should use more
complete college-level data for pre-treatment characteristics, or find another way to estimate “static” college
characteristics that are not biased by missing data.
8.3 Additional Empirical Results
8.3.1 College-Level Data
More detailed empirical results. I omit state and state times year fixed effects for space considerations.
Table 16: Admissions Standards: ACT and SAT Scores, All Col-
leges, IPEDS
ACT ACT SAT SAT SAT SAT
Composite Composite Maths Verbal Maths Verbal
14As a reminder, “competitive college” is defined as non-open admissions college
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25th 75th 25th 25th 75th 75th
Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile
Intensity of Treatment 0.799 1.257∗ 15.09 22.40 26.80∗ 34.51∗
(1.34) (2.21) (1.13) (1.41) (2.14) (2.17)
Admissions Rt, 2001 -3.272∗∗∗ -2.491∗∗∗ -81.05∗∗∗ -79.70∗∗∗ -71.50∗∗∗ -74.71∗∗∗
(-8.14) (-6.60) (-9.48) (-9.74) (-9.19) (-9.20)
Pct Black, 2000 -4.282∗∗∗ -5.363∗∗∗ -95.76∗∗∗ -90.42∗∗∗ -104.0∗∗∗ -105.1∗∗∗
(-13.42) (-12.99) (-13.41) (-13.08) (-12.58) (-12.69)
Pct Native Am, 2000 -2.925∗∗ -4.336∗∗ -53.82+ -47.59 -64.93 -89.96+
(-3.05) (-2.97) (-1.89) (-1.56) (-1.40) (-1.76)
Pct Hispanic, 2000 -5.934∗∗∗ -6.953∗∗∗ -119.9∗∗∗ -103.6∗∗∗ -124.0∗∗∗ -117.5∗∗∗
(-5.47) (-7.23) (-6.05) (-5.44) (-6.77) (-6.46)
Pct Asian, 2000 4.681∗∗∗ 5.420∗∗∗ 143.6∗∗∗ 49.38∗ 156.7∗∗∗ 65.10∗
(3.93) (4.57) (5.94) (2.44) (5.49) (2.33)
Pct Unknwn Race, 2000 -0.559 -0.921 -20.37 2.863 -21.46 -0.216
(-0.54) (-1.07) (-1.01) (0.13) (-1.23) (-0.01)
Tuition in-state 0.000109∗∗ 0.0000493 0.00222∗∗ 0.00269∗∗ 0.00123+ 0.00170∗
(2.99) (1.35) (2.94) (3.82) (1.71) (2.25)
Tuition out-of-state 0.000221∗∗∗ 0.000225∗∗∗ 0.00436∗∗∗ 0.00352∗∗∗ 0.00430∗∗∗ 0.00370∗∗∗
(5.58) (5.71) (5.36) (4.57) (5.52) (4.55)
Associates degree 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
2-4 Academic Years 0.0911 -0.192 -21.02 -13.25 -30.24∗∗ -10.87
(0.23) (-0.40) (-1.46) (-1.48) (-3.05) (-0.85)
Bachelors degree 0.791∗∗ 1.216∗∗∗ 16.53∗∗ 17.26∗∗ 17.10∗∗ 16.79∗
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(3.16) (4.24) (2.80) (2.88) (3.07) (2.57)
Postbaccalaureate 0.549 0.677 12.39 19.02 11.87 21.90
(1.10) (1.30) (1.00) (1.46) (1.05) (1.51)
Masters degree 0.694∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗ 16.44∗∗ 15.92∗∗ 15.87∗∗ 14.17∗
(2.99) (4.41) (2.90) (2.77) (2.94) (2.25)
Post-masters 0.555∗ 0.895∗∗ 17.00∗∗ 14.83∗ 12.99∗ 8.379
(2.14) (3.07) (2.82) (2.47) (2.24) (1.26)
Doctors degree 1.385∗∗∗ 1.854∗∗∗ 32.64∗∗∗ 27.53∗∗∗ 31.89∗∗∗ 23.67∗∗
(5.68) (6.58) (5.57) (4.66) (5.72) (3.67)
Degree-granting 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Nondegree-granting 0.533 0.112 33.34+ 24.23 29.59+ 7.959
(0.49) (0.11) (1.72) (1.55) (1.88) (0.45)
Grad Rt, 2000 6.688∗∗∗ 6.225∗∗∗ 142.6∗∗∗ 134.3∗∗∗ 122.8∗∗∗ 120.8∗∗∗
(11.87) (11.51) (13.50) (12.47) (12.00) (11.31)
Military Academy 6.304∗∗∗ 6.196∗∗∗ 90.86∗∗∗ 59.26∗∗ 80.59∗∗∗ 54.61∗∗∗
(9.06) (9.51) (6.56) (3.30) (6.95) (4.13)
Public 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Non-Profit Private -2.095∗∗∗ -1.143∗∗∗ -53.88∗∗∗ -47.94∗∗∗ -39.68∗∗∗ -34.04∗∗∗
(-7.93) (-4.31) (-9.44) (-8.52) (-7.17) (-5.72)
For-Profit Private -3.623∗∗∗ -2.572∗∗∗ -87.78∗∗∗ -78.57∗∗∗ -76.98∗∗∗ -59.37∗∗∗
(-5.99) (-5.20) (-7.07) (-8.52) (-7.19) (-6.77)
Unemployment 0.371 -0.456 19.17 -2.925 -28.77 3.215
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(0.28) (-0.25) (0.26) (-0.05) (-0.47) (0.05)
GDP Per Capita 0.000342 -0.000263 0.00315 -0.00432 -0.0156 -0.00281
(0.65) (-0.36) (0.12) (-0.20) (-0.69) (-0.12)
year=2001 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
year=2002 -1.178 1.203 -21.45 13.39 76.13 -21.04
(-0.49) (0.35) (-0.17) (0.13) (0.72) (-0.18)
year=2003 -1.097 0.0827 -0.598 6.627 69.62 -5.175
(-0.47) (0.02) (-0.00) (0.06) (0.67) (-0.05)
year=2004 -1.662 0.723 -35.96 -4.735 119.8 22.55
(-0.45) (0.14) (-0.19) (-0.03) (0.77) (0.13)
year=2005 -1.580 0.708 15.28 42.14 107.0 36.86
(-0.56) (0.17) (0.11) (0.35) (0.88) (0.29)
year=2006 -1.218 0.140 33.82 34.49 80.68 40.25
(-0.75) (0.06) (0.51) (0.55) (1.25) (0.61)
year=2007 -1.228 0.125 22.35 10.18 57.85 36.39
(-0.94) (0.07) (0.47) (0.21) (1.25) (0.81)
year=2008 -1.258 0.279 -6.291 9.716 64.93 42.75
(-0.69) (0.11) (-0.08) (0.13) (0.87) (0.55)
year=2009 -2.449 2.653 -75.25 21.05 167.1 4.321
(-0.35) (0.27) (-0.20) (0.07) (0.53) (0.01)
year=2010 -3.021 4.394 -118.1 33.80 256.7 -10.62
(-0.28) (0.29) (-0.20) (0.07) (0.52) (-0.02)
year=2011 -2.696 3.572 -105.4 10.75 225.7 -21.92
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(-0.30) (0.28) (-0.22) (0.03) (0.56) (-0.05)
year=2012 -2.013 2.575 -59.08 17.45 163.8 -3.676
(-0.32) (0.29) (-0.18) (0.06) (0.57) (-0.01)
year=2013 -1.886 2.705 -50.92 21.11 151.6 1.719
(-0.32) (0.33) (-0.17) (0.08) (0.58) (0.01)
R2 0.715 0.692 0.739 0.714 0.713 0.675
Adjusted R2 0.700 0.674 0.724 0.698 0.697 0.657
Observations 12956 12950 13089 13006 13087 13007
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0001, Standard Errors Clustered by College
Table 17: Admissions Standards: Admissions Rate, Various Sub-
samples, IPEDS
Admissions Admissions Admissions Admissions Admissions Admissions
Rate Rate, ACT Rate, SAT Rate, Not Rate, Not Rate, Missing
Rate Dominant Dominant Missing Missing ACT and SAT
All Colleges Colleges ACT Data SAT Data Data
Intensity of Treatment 0.0358 0.0555 -0.0766 0.0471 0.0306 0.0306
(1.06) (1.30) (-1.01) (1.38) (0.83) (0.83)
Admissions Rt, 2001 0.493∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗
(22.63) (10.40) (22.07) (20.71) (22.74) (22.74)
Pct Black, 2000 -0.109∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ -0.0674∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.0918∗∗ -0.0918∗∗
(-5.02) (-5.51) (-2.25) (-4.56) (-3.52) (-3.52)
Pct Native Am, 2000 -0.0638 -0.269∗ -0.108 -0.111 -0.0852 -0.0852
(-0.78) (-2.04) (-0.34) (-1.25) (-0.63) (-0.63)
Pct Hispanic, 2000 -0.0635 -0.117 -0.00926 0.0359 -0.0163 -0.0163
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(-1.34) (-1.15) (-0.14) (0.65) (-0.28) (-0.28)
Pct Asian, 2000 -0.202∗ -0.378∗∗ -0.152+ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗
(-2.17) (-2.66) (-1.79) (-4.44) (-3.95) (-3.95)
Pct Unkwn Race, 2000 -0.120∗∗ 0.0689 -0.0477 0.0156 -0.0178 -0.0178
(-3.47) (1.39) (-1.26) (0.39) (-0.50) (-0.50)
Tuition in-state -0.00000225 5.16e-08 -0.00000514+ -0.00000347 -0.00000534∗ -0.00000534∗
(-0.93) (0.02) (-1.91) (-1.54) (-2.36) (-2.36)
Tuition out-of-state -0.00000191 -0.000000282 0.00000102 -0.00000218 0.000000157 0.000000157
(-0.77) (-0.09) (0.36) (-0.96) (0.07) (0.07)
Less than 2 Years Deg 0 0
(.) (.)
Associates degree -0.0539 0 -0.171 0 0 0
(-0.86) (.) (-1.20) (.) (.) (.)
2-4 Academic Years -0.0383 0.0419 -0.235∗∗ 0.0828 -0.0160 -0.0160
(-0.70) (0.76) (-2.97) (0.52) (-0.14) (-0.14)
Bachelors degree -0.0652 -0.0380 -0.158 -0.00522 0.00948 0.00948
(-1.04) (-1.23) (-1.10) (-0.27) (0.53) (0.53)
Postbaccalaureate -0.0687 -0.0706 -0.189 -0.0431 -0.00125 -0.00125
(-0.90) (-1.16) (-1.23) (-0.83) (-0.02) (-0.02)
Masters degree -0.0440 -0.0329 -0.158 -0.00312 0.0105 0.0105
(-0.70) (-1.09) (-1.10) (-0.17) (0.62) (0.62)
Post-masters -0.0433 -0.0156 -0.169 0.0131 0.0167 0.0167
(-0.68) (-0.50) (-1.17) (0.68) (0.91) (0.91)
Doctors degree -0.0447 -0.0160 -0.165 0.00547 0.0203 0.0203
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(-0.70) (-0.53) (-1.14) (0.29) (1.17) (1.17)
Degree-granting 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Nondegree-granting -0.124∗∗ -0.335∗∗ -0.0480 -0.325+ -0.183 -0.183
(-3.11) (-3.76) (-0.39) (-1.89) (-1.50) (-1.50)
Grad Rt, 2000 -0.0725∗∗ -0.0335 -0.0614∗ -0.0710∗∗ -0.0666∗∗ -0.0666∗∗
(-3.37) (-0.89) (-2.32) (-3.05) (-2.97) (-2.97)
Military Academy -0.280∗∗∗ 0 -0.159∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗
(-9.27) (.) (-2.94) (-5.72) (-7.40) (-7.40)
Public 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Non-Profit Private 0.00402 -0.0444∗ 0.0323 0.00772 0.0345∗ 0.0345∗
(0.24) (-2.01) (1.55) (0.47) (2.04) (2.04)
For-Profit Private -0.0229 -0.0330 0.0455 -0.0115 0.0848∗ 0.0848∗
(-1.16) (-0.69) (0.84) (-0.28) (2.01) (2.01)
Unemployment 0.00448 -0.0575 0.766∗∗∗ -0.0122 -0.0528 -0.0528
(0.03) (-0.41) (8.48) (-0.09) (-0.36) (-0.36)
GDP Per Capita 0.00000776 -0.0000199 0.000139∗∗∗ 9.93e-08 -5.39e-08 -5.39e-08
(0.14) (-0.35) (4.06) (0.00) (-0.00) (-0.00)
year=2001 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
year=2002 -0.0383 0.0960 -0.507∗∗∗ -0.000252 0.0439 0.0439
(-0.16) (0.40) (-5.53) (-0.00) (0.17) (0.17)
year=2003 -0.0725 0.0511 -1.122∗∗∗ -0.0375 -0.0144 -0.0144
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(-0.31) (0.21) (-8.42) (-0.17) (-0.06) (-0.06)
year=2004 -0.108 0.0845 -1.345∗∗∗ -0.0624 -0.0120 -0.0120
(-0.30) (0.23) (-7.69) (-0.18) (-0.03) (-0.03)
year=2005 -0.0985 0.0712 -1.006∗∗∗ -0.0504 -0.0414 -0.0414
(-0.34) (0.25) (-6.61) (-0.19) (-0.14) (-0.14)
year=2006 -0.130 -0.0183 -1.305∗∗∗ -0.0950 -0.143 -0.143
(-0.85) (-0.12) (-5.40) (-0.67) (-0.96) (-0.96)
year=2007 -0.167 -0.0952 -1.220∗∗∗ -0.155 -0.159 -0.159
(-1.45) (-0.78) (-4.28) (-1.40) (-1.41) (-1.41)
year=2008 -0.130 -0.0469 -1.329∗∗∗ -0.125 -0.181 -0.181
(-0.72) (-0.25) (-4.72) (-0.73) (-1.05) (-1.05)
year=2009 -0.133 0.193 -2.358∗∗∗ -0.0606 0.0687 0.0687
(-0.18) (0.26) (-5.13) (-0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
year=2010 -0.178 0.328 -3.014∗∗∗ -0.0569 0.191 0.191
(-0.16) (0.29) (-7.09) (-0.05) (0.16) (0.16)
year=2011 -0.153 0.255 -2.997∗∗∗ -0.0672 0.142 0.142
(-0.16) (0.27) (-6.84) (-0.08) (0.15) (0.15)
year=2012 -0.130 0.155 -2.674∗∗∗ -0.0749 0.0404 0.0404
(-0.20) (0.23) (-5.64) (-0.12) (0.06) (0.06)
year=2013 -0.110 0.176 -1.995∗∗∗ -0.0359 0.0272 0.0272
(-0.18) (0.28) (-6.75) (-0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
R2 0.379 0.330 0.551 0.475 0.497 0.497
Adjusted R2 0.356 0.282 0.527 0.446 0.469 0.469
Observations 19140 6506 9692 12958 13092 13092
t statistics in parentheses
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+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0001, Standard Errors Clustered by College
Table 18: Admissions Standards: Separate ACT and SAT Treat-
ments, IPEDS Results
Admission ACT ACT SAT SAT SAT SAT
Rate Composite Composite Maths Verbal Maths Verbal
(Percent) 25th 75th 25th 25th 75th 75th
Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile
Intensity to 0.0428 0.872 1.361∗
Treat ACT (1.13) (1.37) (2.19)
Intensity to -0.00571 -2.979 -2.910 -8.450 -3.535
Treat SAT (-0.09) (-0.13) (-0.10) (-0.38) (-0.13)
Admissions Rt, 2001 0.493∗∗∗ -3.267∗∗∗ -2.484∗∗∗ -80.98∗∗∗ -79.60∗∗∗ -71.35∗∗∗ -74.56∗∗∗
(22.62) (-8.13) (-6.58) (-9.46) (-9.71) (-9.15) (-9.14)
Pct Black, 2000 -0.110∗∗∗ -4.286∗∗∗ -5.370∗∗∗ -95.57∗∗∗ -90.14∗∗∗ -103.7∗∗∗ -104.7∗∗∗
(-5.03) (-13.45) (-13.02) (-13.35) (-12.99) (-12.47) (-12.56)
Pct Native Am, 2000 -0.0631 -2.911∗∗ -4.311∗∗ -54.74+ -48.91 -66.61 -92.11+
(-0.77) (-3.04) (-2.97) (-1.92) (-1.61) (-1.46) (-1.83)
Pct Hispanic, 2000 -0.0641 -5.948∗∗∗ -6.975∗∗∗ -120.0∗∗∗ -103.6∗∗∗ -124.1∗∗∗ -117.5∗∗∗
(-1.35) (-5.48) (-7.24) (-6.06) (-5.45) (-6.77) (-6.46)
Pct Asian, 2000 -0.202∗ 4.674∗∗∗ 5.409∗∗∗ 142.7∗∗∗ 47.99∗ 155.0∗∗∗ 62.97∗
(-2.17) (3.93) (4.56) (5.91) (2.37) (5.42) (2.24)
Pct Unkwn Race, 2000 -0.121∗∗ -0.562 -0.924 -20.45 2.737 -21.62 -0.407
(-3.49) (-0.54) (-1.07) (-1.01) (0.13) (-1.24) (-0.02)
Tuition in-state -0.00000224 0.000108∗∗ 0.0000483 0.00223∗∗ 0.00270∗∗ 0.00124+ 0.00171∗
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(-0.92) (2.97) (1.32) (2.94) (3.81) (1.71) (2.25)
Tuition out-of-state -0.00000192 0.000222∗∗∗ 0.000226∗∗∗ 0.00436∗∗∗ 0.00351∗∗∗ 0.00430∗∗∗ 0.00370∗∗∗
(-0.78) (5.59) (5.74) (5.35) (4.55) (5.49) (4.50)
Less than 2 Years Deg 0
(.)
Associates degree -0.0549 0 0 0 0 0 0
(-0.88) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
2-4 Academic Years -0.0385 0.0945 -0.187 -21.22 -13.54 -30.60∗∗ -11.30
(-0.70) (0.24) (-0.39) (-1.47) (-1.52) (-3.09) (-0.89)
Bachelors degree -0.0664 0.791∗∗ 1.216∗∗∗ 16.55∗∗ 17.30∗∗ 17.14∗∗ 16.85∗
(-1.06) (3.16) (4.24) (2.79) (2.87) (3.05) (2.56)
Postbaccalaureate -0.0699 0.549 0.678 12.45 19.13 11.98 22.06
(-0.92) (1.10) (1.30) (1.00) (1.46) (1.04) (1.51)
Masters degree -0.0451 0.697∗∗ 1.203∗∗∗ 16.37∗∗ 15.81∗∗ 15.74∗∗ 14.01∗
(-0.71) (3.00) (4.42) (2.87) (2.74) (2.89) (2.21)
Post-masters -0.0445 0.557∗ 0.897∗∗ 16.85∗∗ 14.62∗ 12.73∗ 8.063
(-0.70) (2.15) (3.08) (2.78) (2.43) (2.18) (1.21)
Doctors degree -0.0458 1.388∗∗∗ 1.859∗∗∗ 32.62∗∗∗ 27.50∗∗∗ 31.86∗∗∗ 23.63∗∗
(-0.72) (5.70) (6.60) (5.54) (4.62) (5.66) (3.65)
Degree-granting 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Nondegree-granting -0.125∗∗ 0.533 0.113 33.31+ 24.19 29.55+ 7.901
(-3.12) (0.50) (0.11) (1.71) (1.55) (1.87) (0.44)
Grad Rt, 2000 -0.0725∗∗ 6.682∗∗∗ 6.215∗∗∗ 142.7∗∗∗ 134.4∗∗∗ 122.9∗∗∗ 121.0∗∗∗
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(-3.37) (11.86) (11.49) (13.49) (12.45) (11.97) (11.27)
Military Academy -0.278∗∗∗ 6.365∗∗∗ 6.284∗∗∗ 87.01∗∗∗ 53.54∗∗ 73.79∗∗∗ 45.79∗∗∗
(-8.94) (8.83) (9.24) (7.31) (3.86) (7.13) (4.16)
Public 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Non-Profit Private 0.00395 -2.092∗∗∗ -1.138∗∗∗ -53.89∗∗∗ -47.96∗∗∗ -39.69∗∗∗ -34.08∗∗∗
(0.23) (-7.92) (-4.29) (-9.42) (-8.49) (-7.14) (-5.69)
For-Profit Private -0.0229 -3.622∗∗∗ -2.570∗∗∗ -87.50∗∗∗ -78.16∗∗∗ -76.46∗∗∗ -58.74∗∗∗
(-1.17) (-5.99) (-5.18) (-7.04) (-8.51) (-7.09) (-6.59)
Unemployment 0.00443 0.364 -0.467 20.36 -1.141 -26.70 5.977
(0.03) (0.28) (-0.25) (0.27) (-0.02) (-0.43) (0.09)
GDP Per Capita 0.00000667 0.000328 -0.000284 0.00574 -0.000464 -0.0111 0.00313
(0.12) (0.62) (-0.38) (0.22) (-0.02) (-0.49) (0.13)
year=2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
year=2002 -0.0374 -1.158 1.235 -25.03 8.052 69.85 -29.30
(-0.16) (-0.48) (0.36) (-0.20) (0.08) (0.66) (-0.25)
year=2003 -0.0708 -1.070 0.124 -5.512 -0.705 60.97 -16.49
(-0.30) (-0.46) (0.04) (-0.04) (-0.01) (0.59) (-0.15)
year=2004 -0.105 -1.609 0.803 -45.82 -19.44 102.4 -0.136
(-0.29) (-0.44) (0.16) (-0.25) (-0.12) (0.66) (-0.00)
year=2005 -0.0942 -1.523 0.793 4.646 26.31 88.22 12.45
(-0.33) (-0.54) (0.20) (0.03) (0.22) (0.73) (0.10)
year=2006 -0.126 -1.166 0.215 24.34 20.40 63.89 18.52
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(-0.82) (-0.72) (0.09) (0.37) (0.33) (1.00) (0.28)
year=2007 -0.163 -1.181 0.193 13.87 -2.429 42.82 16.96
(-1.41) (-0.91) (0.11) (0.30) (-0.05) (0.94) (0.39)
year=2008 -0.127 -1.213 0.345 -14.32 -2.232 50.73 24.32
(-0.70) (-0.66) (0.13) (-0.18) (-0.03) (0.68) (0.31)
year=2009 -0.131 -2.397 2.736 -84.37 7.393 151.1 -16.79
(-0.18) (-0.34) (0.28) (-0.22) (0.02) (0.48) (-0.05)
year=2010 -0.175 -2.943 4.520 -132.0 13.04 232.5 -42.72
(-0.16) (-0.28) (0.30) (-0.22) (0.03) (0.47) (-0.08)
year=2011 -0.150 -2.627 3.683 -117.8 -7.678 204.1 -50.40
(-0.16) (-0.30) (0.29) (-0.24) (-0.02) (0.51) (-0.12)
year=2012 -0.127 -1.954 2.668 -69.43 2.095 145.6 -27.40
(-0.20) (-0.31) (0.30) (-0.21) (0.01) (0.51) (-0.09)
year=2013 -0.106 -1.820 2.807 -61.57 5.191 132.9 -22.87
(-0.17) (-0.31) (0.34) (-0.20) (0.02) (0.52) (-0.08)
R2 0.379 0.715 0.692 0.738 0.713 0.712 0.674
Adjusted R2 0.356 0.700 0.674 0.724 0.698 0.696 0.656
Observations 19140 12956 12950 13089 13006 13087 13007
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0001, Standard Errors Clustered by College
Table 19: Applicantion, Enrollment, and Completion, IPEDS Re-
sults
Applicants Enrolled Undergraduates Graduation Rate
Intensity of Treatment 2377.8+ 442.7∗ 0.0374
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(1.68) (2.04) (0.91)
Admissions Rt, 2001 -4584.2∗∗∗ -5.753 -0.128∗∗∗
(-5.44) (-0.05) (-7.08)
Pct Black, 2000 239.1 -297.4∗ -0.153∗∗∗
(0.38) (-2.50) (-9.00)
Pct Native Am, 2000 -2949.3 -1447.4∗ -0.123
(-1.56) (-2.40) (-1.63)
Pct Hispanic, 2000 1810.2 88.05 -0.220∗∗∗
(0.74) (0.22) (-4.78)
Pct Asian, 2000 19480.5∗∗ 1165.5∗ 0.0432
(3.43) (2.36) (0.87)
Pct Unkwn Race, 2000 371.5 -302.4 -0.104∗∗
(0.18) (-0.83) (-3.38)
ACT Dominant -864.3 -83.49 0.0264
(-0.98) (-0.63) (1.50)
Tuition in-state -1.067∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.00000464∗
(-6.73) (-7.45) (-2.27)
Tuition out-of-state 1.098∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.0000110∗∗∗
(7.16) (6.80) (4.98)
Less than 2 Years Deg 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Associates degree -708.5 -543.7 0.182∗
(-0.32) (-1.48) (2.26)
2-4 Academic Years -1736.0 -612.0∗ 0.224∗∗
59
(-0.93) (-2.00) (3.58)
Bachelors degree -2093.9 -709.3∗ 0.258∗∗
(-0.97) (-1.99) (3.21)
Postbaccalaureate -2914.9 -659.9+ 0.255∗∗
(-1.26) (-1.80) (2.88)
Masters degree -1713.9 -645.0+ 0.266∗∗
(-0.79) (-1.82) (3.30)
Post-masters -1482.1 -608.4+ 0.285∗∗
(-0.68) (-1.71) (3.57)
Doctors degree 1677.2 99.67 0.305∗∗
(0.76) (0.28) (3.79)
Degree-granting 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Nondegree-granting -2266.5+ -390.0+ 0.0830
(-1.72) (-1.82) (1.06)
Grad Rt, 2000 8013.9∗∗∗ 1473.2∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗
(7.92) (7.52) (15.83)
Military Academy 8798.5∗∗∗ 714.4∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(6.59) (2.39) (4.45)
Public 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Non-Profit Private 1022.4 -119.1 0.0147
(1.23) (-0.81) (0.98)
For-Profit Private -898.5 -136.5 -0.145∗∗∗
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(-0.85) (-0.67) (-3.90)
Unemployment -6286.2+ -1086.0+ 0.00745
(-1.69) (-1.76) (0.28)
GDP Per Capita -2.665+ -0.453+ -0.00000377
(-1.82) (-1.81) (-0.96)
year=2001 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
year=2002 11151.8+ 1937.6+ -0.00221
(1.76) (1.80) (-0.05)
year=2003 11438.3+ 1946.9+ 0.0141
(1.84) (1.81) (0.31)
year=2004 17410.1+ 2987.1+ 0.0147
(1.81) (1.79) (0.28)
year=2005 14123.2+ 2407.6+ 0.0112
(1.91) (1.84) (0.32)
year=2006 8202.0∗ 1392.9+ 0.0329∗
(2.10) (1.87) (2.16)
year=2007 6286.2∗ 1052.8+ 0.00348
(2.17) (1.88) (0.19)
year=2008 9111.2∗ 1531.4+ 0.0118
(1.97) (1.81) (0.49)
year=2009 33462.1+ 5752.9+
(1.73) (1.75)
year=2010 51719.9+ 8877.0+
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(1.72) (1.75)
year=2011 43352.2+ 7375.3+
(1.74) (1.74)
year=2012 31248.5+ 5235.1+
(1.76) (1.72)
year=2013 29143.3+ 4813.1+
(1.77) (1.73)
R2 0.553 0.601 0.728
Adjusted R2 0.533 0.583 0.716
Observations 16192 16175 9987
t statistics in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0001, Standard Erros Clustered by College
8.3.2 Individual-Level Data
Table 20: Enrollment, ACS Data
Freshmen-Aged Freshmen-Aged College-Aged College-Aged Post-High
Dependents All Dependents All School Aged
Enrollment Enrollment Enrollment Enrollment Enrollment
Treated 1.0262+ 0.9930 1.0140 1.0318∗∗ 1.0016
(0.0141) (0.0120) (0.0102) (0.0086) (0.0071)
GDP Per Capita 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
In-State Tuition 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Consumption Per Capita 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗
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(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
White 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Black 0.7503∗∗ 0.5729∗∗ 0.7701∗∗ 0.6129∗∗ 0.5774∗∗
(0.0089) (0.0054) (0.0063) (0.0037) (0.0027)
Native American 0.5722∗∗ 0.4338∗∗ 0.5585∗∗ 0.4441∗∗ 0.4239∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0139) (0.0149) (0.0094) (0.0067)
Chinese 2.6820∗∗ 3.6146∗∗ 2.9339∗∗ 3.4992∗∗ 5.1185∗∗
(0.1092) (0.1245) (0.0813) (0.0713) (0.1040)
Japanese 1.8890∗∗ 3.0896∗∗ 2.0183∗∗ 3.4286∗∗ 3.9684∗∗
(0.1955) (0.2757) (0.1399) (0.1830) (0.1982)
Other Asian 1.9538∗∗ 1.8586∗∗ 1.9721∗∗ 1.8630∗∗ 2.2131∗∗
(0.0423) (0.0342) (0.0287) (0.0215) (0.0219)
Other race, nec 0.8972∗∗ 0.8348∗∗ 0.8994∗∗ 0.8299∗∗ 0.7997∗∗
(0.0161) (0.0129) (0.0111) (0.0083) (0.0061)
Two major races 0.9389∗∗ 0.8793∗∗ 0.9894 0.9476∗∗ 0.9233∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0153) (0.0147) (0.0110) (0.0087)
Three or more major races 0.9066 0.8762∗ 0.9598 0.9430+ 0.9462∗
(0.0574) (0.0452) (0.0423) (0.0324) (0.0265)
Cognitive Disability 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Not Hispanic 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Mexican 0.8331∗∗ 0.5488∗∗ 0.7946∗∗ 0.5393∗∗ 0.4379∗∗
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(0.0112) (0.0063) (0.0073) (0.0040) (0.0025)
Puerto Rican 0.7041∗∗ 0.4835∗∗ 0.7141∗∗ 0.5150∗∗ 0.4768∗∗
(0.0207) (0.0121) (0.0147) (0.0084) (0.0059)
Cuban 1.5706∗∗ 1.2807∗∗ 1.4653∗∗ 1.2379∗∗ 1.1224∗∗
(0.0768) (0.0545) (0.0480) (0.0329) (0.0235)
Other 1.1376∗∗ 0.8312∗∗ 1.1420∗∗ 0.8468∗∗ 0.7123∗∗
(0.0230) (0.0142) (0.0158) (0.0092) (0.0060)
Physical Disability 0.3880∗∗ 0.3487∗∗ 0.3700∗∗ 0.3549∗∗ 0.3117∗∗
(0.0091) (0.0067) (0.0059) (0.0044) (0.0028)
Family Income 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Male 1.6369∗∗ 1.5645∗∗ 1.6147∗∗ 1.4681∗∗ 1.6081∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0094) (0.0082) (0.0057) (0.0050)
Born in US (Citizen) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Born abroad of American parents 1.1507∗∗ 1.1825∗∗ 1.2352∗∗ 1.2255∗∗ 1.3084∗∗
(0.0416) (0.0358) (0.0310) (0.0236) (0.0207)
Naturalized citizen 1.3065∗∗ 1.2124∗∗ 1.4016∗∗ 1.2364∗∗ 1.3557∗∗
(0.0333) (0.0272) (0.0230) (0.0167) (0.0140)
Not a citizen 0.6209∗∗ 0.5096∗∗ 0.6488∗∗ 0.5294∗∗ 0.5010∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0075) (0.0079) (0.0047) (0.0032)
Years Accumulated 0.8660∗∗ 0.9404∗∗ 0.9107∗∗ 0.9700∗∗ 1.0485∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0044)
Years Accumulated Sq 1.0063∗∗ 1.0028∗∗ 1.0038∗∗ 1.0012∗∗ 0.9986∗∗
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(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Observations 575995 890902 1132099 1960499 3230912
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.062 0.056 0.044 0.068
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 21: College Attainment, ACS Data
College Dropout College Graduate
Post-College Age Post-College Age
Treated 1.0915∗∗ 1.0744∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0124)
GDP Per Capita 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
In-State Tuition 1.0000∗ 1.0000+
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Consumption Per Capita 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000)
White 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.)
Black 1.3379∗∗ 0.3934∗∗
(0.0093) (0.0031)
Native American 1.0461∗ 0.3232∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0097)
Chinese 0.7583∗∗ 3.0537∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0592)
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Japanese 1.0345 2.1721∗∗
(0.0582) (0.1073)
Other Asian 1.0798∗∗ 1.6453∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0189)
Other race, nec 0.9795+ 0.6838∗∗
(0.0114) (0.0094)
Two major races 1.2322∗∗ 0.8225∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0116)
Three or more major races 1.3454∗∗ 0.8119∗∗
(0.0524) (0.0340)
Cognitive Disability 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.)
Not Hispanic 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.)
Mexican 1.0056 0.2981∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0029)
Puerto Rican 1.1208∗∗ 0.4011∗∗
(0.0205) (0.0080)
Cuban 1.0937∗∗ 0.8739∗∗
(0.0339) (0.0250)
Other 1.2045∗∗ 0.5200∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0070)
Physical Disability 0.7117∗∗ 0.2824∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0046)
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Sex 1.0135∗∗ 1.6044∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0072)
Born in US (Citizen) 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.)
Born abroad of American parents 1.0826∗∗ 1.1717∗∗
(0.0231) (0.0257)
Years Accumulated 0.9297∗∗ 1.3689∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0170)
Years Accumulated Sq 1.0026∗∗ 0.9877∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Observations 1588882 1588882
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.084
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 22: Enrollment, ACS Data, Interacted
Freshmen Freshmen Freshmen College College College
Aged Aged Aged Aged Aged Aged
Dependents Dependents Dependents Dependents Dependents Dependents
Interact Interact Interact Interact
Income Race Income Race
Treated 1.0226 0.9881 1.0426∗∗ 1.0116 0.9477 1.0353∗∗
(0.0142) (0.0652) (0.0157) (0.0103) (0.0468) (0.0115)
GDP Per Capita 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
In-State Tuition 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗
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(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Consumption Per Capita 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗ 1.0000∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
White 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Black 0.8278∗∗ 0.8278∗∗ 0.8325∗∗ 0.8325∗∗ 0.8325∗∗ 0.8396∗∗
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0105) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0072)
Native American 0.6116∗∗ 0.6116∗∗ 0.6048∗∗ 0.5896∗∗ 0.5896∗∗ 0.5857∗∗
(0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0237) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0161)
Chinese 2.8415∗∗ 2.8414∗∗ 2.8653∗∗ 3.0861∗∗ 3.0861∗∗ 3.1074∗∗
(0.1177) (0.1178) (0.1222) (0.0870) (0.0870) (0.0897)
Japanese 1.8353∗∗ 1.8360∗∗ 1.9772∗∗ 1.9700∗∗ 1.9697∗∗ 2.0419∗∗
(0.1918) (0.1917) (0.2124) (0.1369) (0.1368) (0.1448)
Other Asian 1.9875∗∗ 1.9879∗∗ 1.9972∗∗ 2.0003∗∗ 2.0003∗∗ 1.9968∗∗
(0.0437) (0.0437) (0.0452) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0302)
Other race, nec 0.9177∗∗ 0.9177∗∗ 0.9293∗∗ 0.9160∗∗ 0.9160∗∗ 0.9269∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0119)
Two major races 0.9564∗ 0.9563∗ 0.9558∗ 1.0045 1.0045 1.0047
(0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0210) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0156)
Three or more major races 0.9160 0.9159 0.9139 0.9656 0.9655 0.9588
(0.0585) (0.0585) (0.0601) (0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0436)
Cognitive Disability 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Not Hispanic 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
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(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Mexican 0.8788∗∗ 0.8790∗∗ 0.8798∗∗ 0.8284∗∗ 0.8284∗∗ 0.8293∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077)
Puerto Rican 0.7624∗∗ 0.7627∗∗ 0.7623∗∗ 0.7594∗∗ 0.7594∗∗ 0.7594∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157)
Cuban 1.6412∗∗ 1.6418∗∗ 1.6434∗∗ 1.5205∗∗ 1.5207∗∗ 1.5233∗∗
(0.0812) (0.0812) (0.0813) (0.0502) (0.0502) (0.0503)
Other 1.2018∗∗ 1.2022∗∗ 1.2008∗∗ 1.1962∗∗ 1.1963∗∗ 1.1953∗∗
(0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167)
Physical Disability 0.4026∗∗ 0.4025∗∗ 0.4026∗∗ 0.3821∗∗ 0.3820∗∗ 0.3821∗∗
(0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061)
Family Income Over $250,000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Family Income Under $250,000, 1.0614∗ 1.0669∗∗ 1.0615∗ 0.9490∗∗ 0.9470∗∗ 0.9487∗∗
Over $150,000 (0.0248) (0.0262) (0.0248) (0.0158) (0.0165) (0.0158)
Family Income Under $150,000, 0.8903∗∗ 0.8861∗∗ 0.8902∗∗ 0.7654∗∗ 0.7607∗∗ 0.7652∗∗
Over $100,000 (0.0190) (0.0199) (0.0190) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0117)
Family Income Under $100,000, 0.7141∗∗ 0.7121∗∗ 0.7141∗∗ 0.5996∗∗ 0.5967∗∗ 0.5995∗∗
Over $75,000 (0.0153) (0.0160) (0.0153) (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0092)
Family Income Under $75,000, 0.5696∗∗ 0.5670∗∗ 0.5696∗∗ 0.4813∗∗ 0.4775∗∗ 0.4813∗∗
Over $50,000 (0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0120) (0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0073)
Family Income Under $50,000, 0.4341∗∗ 0.4328∗∗ 0.4340∗∗ 0.3748∗∗ 0.3733∗∗ 0.3747∗∗
Over $25,000 (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0092) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0057)
Family Income Under $25,000, 0.3270∗∗ 0.3245∗∗ 0.3269∗∗ 0.2891∗∗ 0.2871∗∗ 0.2891∗∗
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over $10,000 (0.0074) (0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0047)
Family Income Under $10,000 0.2948∗∗ 0.2956∗∗ 0.2949∗∗ 0.2672∗∗ 0.2662∗∗ 0.2673∗∗
(0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0077) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0049)
Male 1.6458∗∗ 1.6457∗∗ 1.6457∗∗ 1.6205∗∗ 1.6205∗∗ 1.6205∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0083)
Born in US (Citizen) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Born abroad of American parents 1.1170∗∗ 1.1169∗∗ 1.1171∗∗ 1.2089∗∗ 1.2089∗∗ 1.2087∗∗
(0.0408) (0.0408) (0.0408) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0307)
Naturalized citizen 1.3243∗∗ 1.3243∗∗ 1.3242∗∗ 1.4186∗∗ 1.4186∗∗ 1.4176∗∗
(0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236)
Not a citizen 0.6558∗∗ 0.6557∗∗ 0.6560∗∗ 0.6793∗∗ 0.6793∗∗ 0.6792∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084)
Years Accumulated 0.8647∗∗ 0.8646∗∗ 0.8648∗∗ 0.9088∗∗ 0.9088∗∗ 0.9088∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Years Accumulated Squared 1.0065∗∗ 1.0065∗∗ 1.0065∗∗ 1.0040∗∗ 1.0040∗∗ 1.0040∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Family Income Over $250,000 1.0000 1.0000
× Treated (.) (.)
Family Income Under $250,000, 0.9471 1.0272
Over $150,000 × Treated (0.0756) (0.0604)
Family Income Under $150,000, 1.0531 1.0777
Over $100,000 × Treated (0.0759) (0.0579)
Family Income Under $100,000, 1.0315 1.0612
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Over $75,000 × Treated (0.0752) (0.0576)
Family Income Under $75,000, 1.0528 1.1047+
Over $50,000 × Treated (0.0754) (0.0590)
Family Income Under $50,000, 1.0305 1.0481
Over $25,000 × Treated (0.0738) (0.0559)
Family Income Under $25,000, 1.0961 1.0903
Over $10,000 × Treated (0.0841) (0.0625)
Family Income Under $10,000 0.9636 1.0419
× Treated (0.0847) (0.0681)
White 1.0000 1.0000
× Treated (.) (.)
Black 0.9353 0.8966∗∗
× Treated (0.0385) (0.0268)
Native American 1.3192 1.2133
× Treated (0.2236) (0.1516)
Chinese 0.8758 0.8874
× Treated (0.1555) (0.1171)
Japanese 0.2083∗∗ 0.4075∗
× Treated (0.0915) (0.1464)
Other Asian 0.9346 1.0531
× Treated (0.0804) (0.0643)
Other race, nec 0.8347∗∗ 0.8405∗∗
× Treated (0.0513) (0.0365)
Two major races 1.0136 1.0031
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× Treated (0.0777) (0.0565)
Three or more major races 1.0738 1.1590
× Treated (0.2873) (0.2316)
Observations 575995 575995 575995 1132099 1132099 1132099
Pseudo R2 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.063 0.063 0.063
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
72
